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I. INTRODUCTION

A cheerful, magical leprechaun springs into the frame and bounds
over the crest of a hill and up a vibrant green cliff overlooking an
equally vibrant body of blue water. Right on his heels follows an
energetic bunch of children who leap over the crest in his pursuit, as one
child yells "Catch Lucky!" With pillowy white clouds and a purple-blue
sky in the background, the leprechaun uses his magical powers to
produce colorful marshmallows in the shape of "Hearts! Stars!
Horseshoes! Clovers and Blue Moons! Pots of gold and rainbows! And
the red balloons!," which appear with magical flashes, sparks, and
fireworks. The last firework transforms into a magical rainbow as each
child jumps onto a life-sized marshmallow "raft" that carries each child
down a swirling rainbow slide that disappears into the rainbow colored
sky below. A shot of "this good breakfast with eight magical
marshmallows" is shown with a piece of toast, orange juice, and a large
bowl of marshmallow cereal as the children race by in the background
on the magical moving rainbow, which at various times resembles a
giant magic carpet, a roller-coaster, and a slide. Referring to the eight
marshmallows, the leprechaun then calls out to the audience: "And
THEY can name them--can YOU?" The cartoon children quickly call
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back: "Hearts! Stars! and Horseshoes!," followed by an additional four
scenes where the magical rainbow slide continues to race through the
sky and across the majestic water and green shoreline. In the last scene,
the rainbow has transformed into an overflowing waterslide that carries
the wide-eyed and wide-grinned leprechaun on a makeshift cereal boxsurfboard, up toward the center of the frame where he presents a large
bowl of marshmallow-themed cereal to the children of his targeted
audience. He finally exclaims, "They're magically delicious!"
Cereal ads are just one example of the many instances where
deception and unfairness may exist in the advertising tactics used to
target young children. Deceptive and unfair trade practices or acts in or
affecting commerce are declared unlawful under 15 U.S.C. § 45, which
also empowers the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to enforce and
regulate these acts and practices.' The FTC can carry out these powers
through measures including law enforcement actions in federal court,
regulation of the industry through the issuance of rules or guidelines,
and consumer education. However, an attempt by the FTC to broadly
regulate children's advertising led to retaliation that has stripped the
FTC, since 1980, of the authority to regulate advertising that targets
children on the basis of unfairness. 3 The FTC's pre-1980 attempt at
broad regulation prompted consequent lobbying by interested parties,
most notably the advertising industry, which sought to thwart the
regulation.4 Moreover, the FTC was unfortunately stripped of all of its
funding for a period of time and, since that time, has undoubtedly been
hesitant to fully exercise those powers that it does have, such as the
ability to regulate deceptive advertising to children 5and initiate
enforcement actions on the basis of unfairness or deception.
Efforts have been made to restore the FTC's unfairness regulatory
authority as it pertains to children, but have yet to be successful. A bill
1. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
2. Roscoe B. Starek, III, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Summary of Prepared Remarks
at the Minnesota Institute of Legal Education: The ABCs at the FTC: Marketing and
Advertising to Children (July 25, 1997), para. 5, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/
starek/minnfin.shtm.
3.

15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (2006); see CAROL J. JENNINGS, Div. OF ENFORCEMENT, FED.

TRADE COMM'N, ADVERTISING TO KIDS AND THE FTC: A REGULATORY RETROSPECTIVE THAT

ADVISES THE PRESENT, at 7-8,

available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/beales/040802

adstokids.pdf (based on a 2004 speech delivered by J. Howard Beales, III, Director of the

Bureau of Consumer Protection); Starek, supra note 2, paras. 14-16. Part IV.C further discusses
this current limitation on the FTC's current ability to regulate unfair acts in advertising targeting
children.
4. JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 7-8; Starek, supra note 2, paras. 14-16.
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (2006); Starek, supra note 2, paras. 14-18 (providing examples

of enforcement actions brought regarding unfairness to children but explaining that the FTC is
specifically denied the authority to issue rules or regulations regarding unfairness in children's
advertising); JENNINGS, supranote 3, at 7-8.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW&

POLICY

[Vol. 14

known as the "Healthy Lifestyles and Prevention America Act of 2007,"
which, in part, proposed to restore the FTC's authority to regulate unfair
advertising targeting children, was introduced into both the Senate and
the House of Representatives in 2007.6 The bill was referred to
committees, but was never reported out or voted on, and therefore must
be reintroduced in a later session before any further action can occur.7
In sum, the FTC's current ability to issue regulations and initiate
enforcement actions regarding unfair and deceptive advertising to
children has been prohibited and restrained by thirty-year old legislation
and the other looming repercussions of the 1970s. Such legislation
stands as a legal obstacle to its "unfairness" regulation and, for purposes
of all other activities, as an unfortunate, threatening reminder to the
Commission that it must tread lightly to avoid creating the perception to
some that it is acting too ambitiously.
According to the FTC, unfair advertising acts or practices are those
that cause or are likely to cause substantial consumer injury that is "not
reasonably avoidable by consumers and is not offset by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition." 8 The substantial injury
requirement can be satisfied by such harms as unwarranted health or
safety risks. 9 In determining whether such injury is reasonably
avoidable, the FTC looks at how susceptible the affected audience? such
as children, may be to the advertising act or practice at issue. For
instance, in 1997, the FTC filed a complaint against the R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company's Joe Camel advertising campaign, which was
alleged to have caused or have been likely to have caused children to
smoke where most children do not understand the serious risk of
addiction or other dangerous adverse health effects." The complaint
was later dismissed after the parties reached a settlement that banned the
6. GovTrack.us, Overview of H.R. 2633: Healthy Lifestyles and Prevention America
Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl10-2633 (last visited Aug. 31, 2009)
(providing the status of the bill) [hereinafter Overview of H.R. 2633]; GovTrack.us, Overview
of S. 1342: Healthy Lifestyles and Prevention America Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill=sl10-1342 (last visited Aug. 31, 2009) [hereinafter Overview of S. 1342]
(providing the status of the bill); The Healthy Lifestyles and Prevention America Act, H.R.
2633, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=110_congbills&docid=f:h2633ih.txt.pdf [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 110-2633]; The
Healthy Lifestyles and Prevention America Act, S. 1342, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= I10cong~bills&docid
=f:s1342is.txt.pdf [hereinafter S. No. 110-1342].
7. Overview of H.R. 2633, supranote 6; Overview of S.1342, supranote 6.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006); JENmNGS, supranote 3 (citing Unfairness Policy Statement,
appended to In re Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070-76 (1984)); see also infra Part V.C
for additional discussion.
9. Starek, supra note 2, para. 3.
10. Id.para. 4.
11.

Id. paras. 9-14.
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use of all cartoon characters, including
Joe Camel, in the advertising or
12
marketing of any tobacco product.
The FTC states that a deceptive advertising act or practice occurs
where "there is a representation, omission or practice that is likely to
mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the
consumer's detriment."' 3 The term "deceptive" has also been used by
courts in their articulations of the elements required for competitors to
establish a false advertising claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B)
(section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Trademark Act) for a false or
misleading statement.14 In order to be actionable under either 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 or the Lanham Act's section 43(a)(1)(B), the FTC and case law
have articulated that the level of deception must be material-that is,
likely to affect the conduct or decision of the consumer regarding the
product.' 5
Given that there are various disincentives for competitors to bring
section 43(a)(1)(B) false advertising claims, 16 and that the FTC is the
agency charged with regulating advertising regardless of the ad's
medium of distribution,' 7 the FTC arguably has the greatest potential to
effectively protect children from unfair and deceptive advertising
practices.18 Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, the FTC's
definitions of "deceptive" and "unfair" can be assumed for the duration
of this Article.
More specifically, the FTC applies three elements in its deception
analysis: (1) the representation, omission, or practice must be likely to
mislead the consumer; (2) the act or practice must be examined from the
perspective of the reasonable consumer, with the perspective of a
particular group (such as children) taken where the representation or
practice affects or is directed primarily to that particular group; and (3)
the representation, omission, or practice must be material-that is,
likely to affect a consumer's conduct or decision, thereby leading to

12. In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Docket No. 9285, Order Dismissing Complaint
paras. 4-5 (complaint issued May 28, 1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/01/
d09285.htm.
13. Deception Policy Statement, appended to In re Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C.
110, 176 (1984); see also Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. F.T.C., 785 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir.
1986); JENNINGS, supranote 3, at 1; see infra Part V.C for additional discussion.
14. Lanham Trademark Act § 43(a))(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l)(B) (2006); see infra
Part V.A for additional discussion of elements required by § 43(a)(1)(B).
15. See infra Part V.A. 1; see infra note 19 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part V.A.3.
17. Sandra L. Calvert, Children as Consumers: Advertising and Marketing, 18 THE

FuTuRE OF CHILDREN 205, 222 (2008), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/future-of
children/vO18/18.1 .calvert.pdf
18. See infra Parts V, VI.B for additional discussion the potential of FTC enforcement.
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injury. 19 Thus, like the term "unfair," the term "deceptive" denotes a
particular meaning in the context of advertising regulation and
enforcement as opposed to how it may be used in casual conversation or
under other statutes. 20 Importantly, the FTC has stated that the
perspective of a particular group of consumers, such as young children,
must be taken where the advertising affects or is directed primarily
toward them. 2 1 For instance, in the past, toy ads that have depicted
ballerinas pirouetting, helicopters hovering in mid air, and horses
standing up on their own, where they could not actually do so, have
been found deceptive from the perspective of an ordinary child.22 While
adults would realize the advertisers used special techniques, a
reasonable child would expect the toy to be able to perform the feats
depicted in the ad.23
While current advertising laws and regulation in the United States
consider the perspective of young children to some extent, whether such
regulation and enforcement has accurately taken children's true
cognitive abilities and skills into account is questionable. Research has
demonstrated that young children do not comprehend ads as older
children and adults do, and therefore, are particularly susceptible to, and
affected by, such advertising. 24 Research has also directly linked certain
25
types of advertising targeting children with physical harms in children.
19. Deception Policy Statement, appended to In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110,
176-83 (1984); see also JENNINGS, supranote 3.
20. It should be noted that the use of the term "deceptive" here is distinct from other legal
uses of the term. For instance, section 2(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act states that trade names
or marks consisting of deceptive matter can never be registered. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006). 2 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 11:55, 11:59
(4th ed. 2009). Under section 2(a), a mark will only be held outright "deceptive" "where the
mark will bestow upon the product an appearance of greater quality or salability than it has in
fact." McCARTHY, supra, § 11:55. There must be a "material" mis-description or falsity that is
likely to "significantly induce a purchaser's decision to buy." Id. Such deception must be
"significant" and is not present where the deception is "perfectly innocent, harmless or
neglible." Id. A second category of marks are considered "deceptively misdescriptive marks"
under section 2(e) if they "(1) misrepresent any fact concerning the goods or services; and (2)
consumers are likely to believe the mis-description." Id. These marks are not necessarily barred
from registration as a mark if they have achieved secondary meaning. Id. Unlike the "material"
requirement for outright deceptive marks, "deceptively misdescriptive marks" simply require
the misdescription to be a relevant factor that may be considered in purchasing decisions. Id.
21. Deception Policy Statement, appended to In re Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C.
110, 176-83 (1984); see also JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 1-2.
22. JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 2-3.
23. Id.
24. DALE KUNKEL ET AL., AM. PSYCH. ASS'N, REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON
ADVERTISING AND CHILDREN: SECTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE INCREASING
COMMERCIALIZATION OF CHILDHOOD 1 (2004), available at http://www.apa.org/releaseschildrenads.pdf.

25. See infra Part IV.
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This Article argues that while current regulation and enforcement
may protect adults effectively, it fails to appropriately weigh the
cognitive abilities of children. If the true mental perspectives of children
are taken into account and incorporated into the FTC's definitions of
unfair and deceptive, various advertising tactics that are still used
regularly in children's advertising are potentially deceptive, misleading,
or unfair to children in certain contexts. This Article argues that the use
of imaginary cartoon characters, fantasy worlds, celebrity
endorsements, special effects, extraneous footage and props, disclaimers
that children do not understand, and the use of puffery-exaggerated,
boastful statements that represent an advertiser's opinion of a
product 2 6-are just some of the advertising tactics
used that may be
27
deceptive and unfair to children in certain contexts.
Such advertising tactics can potentially produce false expectations
about the quality and nature of products to children, or can threaten their
health and well-being. This Article discusses why increased regulation
and enforcement of particular advertising tactics are needed where
advertising primarily targets children-where the audience is composed
primarily of children or where the product is primarily targeted toward
children. In the past, regulatory proposals have considered banning all
advertising to young children or to children for particular product
categories.
Due to the controversial nature of these broader proposals in the past
and the standards of deceptiveness and unfairness, this Article suggests
that a narrower regulatory approach may be more successful. Such an
approach could target specific tactics used toward children, rather than
all ads for children or a class of particular products. Regulating unfair
children's advertising would first require a restoration of such authority
in the FTC through the enactment of a law similar to the Healthy
Lifestyles and Prevention America Act of 2007. On the other hand, such
narrower regulation of deceptive ads could be initiated under the FTC's
existing regulatory authority for deceptive children's advertising
without the passage of additional legislation.
Like many ads targeting children, the overwhelming theme of the ad
illustrated at the opening of this Article and the unrealistic expectation it
creates, is that the advertised cereal will bring fun, excitement, and even
magic to a child's life.28 However, what children fail to realize as they
are watching the ad is that the cereal does not come with magical
26. Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). Puffery
has also been defined as "an exaggeration or overstatement expressed in broad, vague, and
commendatory language." Castrol, Inc. v Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 945 (3d Cir. 1993); see
also infra Part III.A.
27. See discussion infra Part III.
28. See discussion infra Part III.C-D.
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powers, fireworks, rollercoasters, slides, waterslides, surfboards, allow
children to fly through the sky, take them to beautifully colored fantasy
worlds, and depending on their tastes, may or may not taste delicious.
While all children may not necessarily believe the cereal is going to
take them on a rollercoaster if they buy it, after viewing the ad, children
undoubtedly associate the cereal with other children having fun3
excitement, or at the least, experiencing a "magically delicious" taste. 6
Children also do not realize the cereal is not a required part of a "good"
breakfast, 3 ' or that most adults would not consider it part of any "good"
or nutritious breakfast. Additionally, the ad suggests to children that
most or all children can name the eight marshmallows because they
may lead to feelings of insecurity
regularly purchase
32 the cereal, which
materiality.
and
Adults on the other hand, have a greater understanding of ads and
understand that the principal purpose of advertising is undoubtedly an
economic one: to sell more goods and services to consumers. 33 While
ads may be informative or persuasive and influential, the majority of
ads are designed solely to persuade and influence the consumer, rather
than provide her with useful information. 34 Because we as adults
understand the purpose behind advertising, 35 we realize that we must
first "filter" the content of ads with a certain sense of skepticism before
we simply accept the persuasive message that is presented before us.
Young children do not have this luxury and "are unaware that
36
commercials are designed to persuade them to buy specific products."
In short, with their limited cognitive capabilities, young children do
not understand the truths behind ads that adults take for granted. 37 This
decreased understanding of ads may potentially cause certain
advertising tactics to produce unrealistic expectations for children. 38 In
addition, the advertising of certain products to children has been linked
to such physical harms as obesity, health problems associated with
29. See discussion infra Part III.C-D.
30. See discussion infra Part III.C-D.
31. See discussion infra Part III.B.
32. See discussion infra Part IV.
33. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1164, 1167 (1948), reprintedin 8 YALE L.J. 1619 (1999).
34. Id. at 1168-69.
35. Cf Calvert, supra note 17, at 214; DEBORAH ROEDDER JOHN, Through the Eyes of a
Child, in ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 16-17 (M. Carole Macklin
& Les Carlson eds., 1999).
36. Calvert, supra note 17, at 214 (footnote omitted); see JOHN, supra note 35, at 7-10.
37. See discussion infra Part II.
38. See discussion infra Part IV.
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obesity, and even psychological harms such as insecurity and
materiality. 39 As a result, certain advertising tactics used toward
children in various instances may potentially cause the ads to be
deceptive, or where children are harmed, unfair.
The parents of today's households are time-starved40 and cannot be
expected to prevent their children from watching all television
commercials or viewing other ads. While parents certainly must set
limits on their children's desires, parents also have an interest in
pleasing their children to some extent.4 ' Parental spending has been
shown to be strongly influenced by their children's desires.42
Accordingly, this Article calls for Congress to provide the FTC with
broader authority to regulate and enforce advertising targeting children
by passing a bill similar to the "Healthy Lifestyles and Prevention
America Act of 2007." Enacting such a bill would restore
- 43 the FTC's
authority to regulate unfair advertising targeting children, a power that
it currently lacks. 44 In addition, this Article urges the FTC to act to the
full extent of such authority, if restored, and properly protect children
from both deceptive and unfair advertising tactics, especially given the
substantial volumes of research demonstrating children's limited
cognitive capacity and the harms that certain advertising tactics may
pose. Until such authority is restored, this Article urges the FTC to act
to the full extent of its current limited authority to protect children from
problematic advertising.
In light of the current regulatory and enforcement measures, this
Article looks at the cognitive capabilities of children and the resultant
problems with ads today. In addition, this Article discusses some
potential solutions and the constitutionality of those solutions. Part 11
argues that young children do not have the cognitive capacity necessary
to process and understand ads in the same way as adults. As a result,
certain advertising tactics that saturate ads targeting children are
potentially deceptive and unfair in certain contexts. Part HI discusses
39. See discussion infra Part IV. Although this Article mentions the psychological harms,
the physical harms of obesity and those additional harms with which it is associated are the main
focus of the Article.
40.

JULIET B.

SCHOR, BORN TO Buy: THE COMMERCIALIZED CHILD AND

THE NEW

CONSUMER CULTURE 25 (2004).
41. See BARRIE GUNTER ET AL., ADVERTISING TO CIULDREN ON TV: CONTENT, IMPACT,
AND REGULATION 111-14 (2005).
42. See id. Focus groups are regularly run on children as young as five years, due to the
widespread effects of children's pestering on their parents' spending. Id. at 1 11.
43. H.R. Rep. No. 110-2633, supranote 6; S. No. 110-1342, supra note 6.

44.

15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (2006) ("The Commission shall not have any authority to

promulgate any rule in the children's advertising proceeding pending on May 28, 1980, or in

any substantially similar proceeding on the basis of a determination by the Commission that
such advertising constitutes an unfair act or practice in or affecting commerce.").
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various advertising tactics that may be deceptive, misleading, and unfair
from a child's perspective in certain circumstances. Part III also argues
that while current regulation and enforcement take a child's perspective
into account, the "perspective" that is currently taken is not accurate
when compared to scientific findings. Part IV discusses some of the
harms and risks that the discussed advertising tactics poses to children.
Part V explains why current means of self-regulation, government
regulation, and parental supervision fail to offer children adequate
protection. Part VI argues that the FTC should be restored its authority
to regulate unfair advertising to children and proposes potential
approaches for regulating advertising targeting children. Part VI
assesses the constitutionality of these proposals.
II. CHILDREN PERCEIVE ADVERTISING DIFFERENTLY THAN ADULTS

Several researchers have argued that between the ages of seven and
eight, children begin to understand persuasive intent, 45 and become
skeptical of ads.46 However, research suggests that this knowledge alone
is not enough to protect children from advertising. A more in-depth
knowledge of advertising tactics is required to protect children. This
level of knowledge is typically not acquired by children until the ages of
eleven to fourteen and is not spontaneously retrieved until children are
over the age of twelve.4 7 If children aged eight to twelve are educated
with the knowledge about specific advertising tactics, and are regularly
reminded to use such information, they can potentially protect
themselves as effectively as adults and children over twelve. 08 However,
children seven and under have no understanding of advertiser intent and
are defenseless against advertising because they have difficulty utilizing
mental storage and retrieval strategies.49
A. PersuasiveIntent
In order to achieve mature comprehension of advertising, children
need to be able to "attribute persuasive intent to advertising and to apply
a degree of skepticism to their interpretation of advertising messages
consistent with that knowledge." 50 Numerous independent studies have
demonstrated that children typically do not understand the persuasive
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part H.D.
See infra Part II.C-D.
See infra Part IIA-D.
KUNKEL ET AL., supranote 24, at 5.
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and influential intent of advertising until they are seven or eight years
old (a period known as the "concrete operational stage" of
development). 51 In one study, "[a] role-playing experiment involving
Sesame Street characters also found that preschool children understand
the concept of buying much earlier than they can grasp and apply the
concept of selling." 52 While they can distinguish a television
commercial from a program around the age of five, children still tend to
simply view advertising as a 53
shorter form of entertainment, or as a
source of unbiased information.
Verbal and nonverbal experiments similarly indicate a strong reason
to believe that the vast majority of children younger than seven or eight
do not have an understanding of the persuasive and influential intent of
advertising. 54 For example, in verbal experiments, experimenters asked
children open-ended questions such as, "What do commercials try to get
you to do?" 55 In the nonverbal version of the study, children were asked
a similar question, but were presented with a set of four pictures
depicting various activities; the correct choice was an image showing a
child and mother putting the product into a shopping cart. 56 In the
nonverbal study, 80% of the children aged three to five failed to identif
the correct picture; similar results were found in the verbal equivalent.
The recognition of persuasive intent gradually increases with age, and
notably jumps from 52.7% of six and seven year-old to 87.1% of eight
and nine year olds to 99% of ten and eleven year olds. 58 Beginning
around seven or eight, older children begin to recognize persuasive
intent, with responses that indicate they understand commercials are
"trying to get people to buy something." 59 Younger children tended to
say things like "commercials are funny," (indicating they simply
recognize it as a form of entertainment) or that "commercials tell you
about things you can buy" (which merely indicates recognition of the
informative intent, rather than persuasive intent of ads).6 °

51. GuNTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 32. Six independent studies were cited by Deborah
Roedder John in her article, but there have undoubtedly been others. JOHN, supra note 35, at 6,
7; KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 6-7.
52. KUNKEL ETAL., supra note 24, at 7.
53. JOHN, supra note 35, at 6, 7.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 7-10.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 7; Calvert, supra note 17, at 217.
See JOHN, supra note 35, at 7.
Id.
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B. Deception and Skepticism
Around the age of eight, children begin to realize that commercials
do not always tell the truth, and "as children move into the
preadolescent years," their beliefs about the veracity of advertising
becomes even more negative. 6 1 A survey found that the percentage of
children who believe advertising "never or only sometimes tells the
truth increases from 50% to 88% to 97%, respectively," as children
progress from kindergarten to third and sixth grade. 62 Undoubtedly,
some of this increased skepticism is due to disappointment with ads for
products in a child's past that did not meet the deceptive expectations
conveyed in the ad.6p Additionally, the increased skepticism is likely
attributable to their "ability to detect
64 specific instances of bias and
deception," which increases with age.
In one study, ten year olds "could not distinguish truthful from
misleading advertising," and recognized their difficulty to do so on their
own. 65 More important, "the presence of skepticism [does not] have
much impact on [a child's] desire for the advertised product," even for
children as old as ten. 66 Part of this is likely due to the recognition by
advertisers of such skepticism and their adoption of newer techniques to
combat it. 67 By "lampooning advertising" or utilizing "gritty realism" in
ads advertisers attempt to deceive children about what is actually an
ad.48 Eleven to twelve year olds, however, more adept at distinguishing
misleading advertising, paid more attention to small nuances and
69
recognized certain tactics used, such as puffery and special effects.
Furthermore, with age, an increased understanding of a commercial's

61. ld. at 10.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 10-11 (quoting ten year old children study respondents as saying
"[Advertisers] can fake well," and "you don't really know what's true until you've tried the
product"); see also Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits For False Advertising Under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 8, 13-14, 20

(1992).
64. JOHN, supra note 35, at 10.
65. Id. at 10-11 (explaining the results of a 1975 study by Bever et al. and providing the

example of a ten year old respondent as saying "you don't really know what's true until you've
tried the product").
66. SCHOR, supranote 40, at 67.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. JOHN, supra note 35, at 11 (noting that eleven and twelve year olds frequently cited
"overstatements and the way they [the actors] talk," and "when they use visual tricks or fake
things," as clues that the advertisers were deceptive). See Part Il for a discussion of puffery,
special effects, and other advertising techniques.
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persuasive intent enables children
to connect deception with the
70
persuasive intent of advertisers.
Technological advancements, such as the prevalence of faster
internet connection speeds in homes, have also enabled other forms of
advertising. These include advergaming and the appearance of
television commercials on websites, some of which are even embedded
among games and activities that children encounter. 71 The internet and
other types of advertising, such as product placement, 72 are a few
examples of where the boundaries between advertising and other
content are harder for children to distinguish,73 thereby increasing the
likelihood that children will not be cued to employ their cognitive
defenses such as skepticism and a recognition of persuasive intent.
While some online advertisers (only 18%) provided "ad break"
reminders (e.g., "Hey Kids, This is Advertising!"), the majority did
not. 74 Furthermore,
it is not clear if such "ad break" reminders are even
75
effective.
The fact that older children feel that the ads they observe are
deceptive suggests that, at least, some advertising tactics are deceptive
or misleading from a reasonable child's perspective. Their perceptions
are likely based upon their own experiences where an unrealistic
expectation was created by an ad for a product that ultimately did not
live up to the representations conveyed in the ad. Younger children do
not recognize this deception as often, yet they likely observe many of
the same ads. These younger children are evidently defenseless against
this deception that they have no idea exists. It seems clear from these
inferences that current regulation insufficiently protects children.
Moreover, it seems that children as old as twelve, despite their
knowledge of deception and persuasive intent in advertising, are still
relatively defenseless a~ainst ads with this information because they are
still "cued processors." Cued processors require external reminders or
memory aids to mentally activate various mental storage and retrieval
strategies available to them that older children and adults activate

70. JOHN, supra note 35, at 10.
71.

ELIZABETH S. MOORE, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, IT'S CHILD'S PLAY:

(2006).
72. SCHOR, supra note 40, at 120 (discussing junk food placements in programs and
movies, such as Foodfight!, a feature length movie created to sell candy and junkfoods,
complete with characters including Twinkie the Kid).
73. MOORE, supra note 71, at 29.
74. Id.; see also SCHOR, supra note 40, at 120.
75. MooRE,supra note 71, at 29.
76. See infra Part II.C (discussing cued processors); see also infra Part II.D (discussing
children under the age of twelve and their lack of defense mechanisms, despite increased
knowledge).
ADVERGAMING AND THE ONLINE MARKETING OF FOOD TO CHILDREN 5, 9
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spontaneously. 77 In other words, "cued processors" will not necessarily
independently retrieve mentally stored knowledge that could serve as a
defense to advertising tactics. Instead, an external stimulus must remind
them to access this stored information. 78 Adults and children over the
age of twelve, however, act as strategic processors and are likely to
spontaneously retrieve such knowledge as a defense. 79 At the very least,
these adult and teenage consumers have much greater knowledge and
experience that lends them additional protection.0
C. Developmental Stages Behind the Perception
Well-respected theories of childhood development help to explain
how children gradually acquire an understanding of advertiser intent,
skepticism, and advertising in general. Childhood development is
marked by noticeable progressions in the way children
"perceive,
81
organize, and think about stimuli in their environment."
Psychologist and cognitive scientist Jean Piaget developed a theory
of childhood cognitive development that is well accepted in the
scientific community. 82 While it has been further developed by other
researchers, 83 Piaget's theory is still applied by developmental
psychologists and researchers in the communication and marketing
fields to understand how children perceive advertising. 84 Piaget's theory
explains that there are four main stages of cognitive development, with
subjects in each stage differing substantially in the cognitive abilities
and resources present for the individual to process stimuli. 85 The four
86
stages of cognitive development are based on chronological age,
although there are undoubtedly degrees of overlap between the stages
with slight variations from one individual to another.
The four stages are: (1) sensorimotor, birth to two years; (2)
preoperational,two to seven years; (3) concrete operational, seven to
eleven years; and (4) formal operational, eleven years and lasting
though adulthood.8 During the sensorimotor stage, the limited language
and cognitive development of children precludes the possibility that
77. JOHN, supra note 35, at 19.
78. Id.; MOORE, supra note 71, at 31; see also Merrie Brucks et al., Children's Use of
Cognitive Defenses Against Television Advertising, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 471,480-81 (1988).
79. See infraPart ll.D.
80. See infraPart ll.D.
81. JOHN, supra note 35, at 17.
82. Id. at 17; Calvert, supranote 17, at 214.
83. See, e.g., GUNTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 31; Calvert, supranote 17, at 215.
84. Calvert, supra note 17, at 214.
85. JOHN, supra note 35, at 17-18.

86. See id.
87. Id.
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they can understand ads. For this reason, the sensorimotor stage will not
be discussed in this Article. 88 Instead, this Article examines the latter
three stages to explain the 89age-based differences in how children
perceive and comprehend ads.
During the preoperational stage, children are perceptually bound to
the stimuli readily perceived in their environment, and accept what they
perceive to be reality. 90 They are distinctly disadvantaged in
understanding the persuasive, commercial intent of ads 9' and, instead,
"see commercials as a means of informin them about the vast number
of attractive products that they can buy." They also tend to focus on a
single dimension or a single, perceptually salient feature of an object or
event. This is a phenomenon known as "centration," which tends to
limit their reasoning ability, 93 and limits their "decision making skills as
informed consumers." 94 As a result of these limited cognitive abilities,
children seven to eight years old and younger tend to focus on limited
properties they observe, such as the attractive properties of a product
and "cannot keep their minds off the product for long." 95 These children
also have difficulty appreciating the viewpoints of other people,
including their beliefs, desires, and motives. This helps explain why
children have difficulty understanding the persuasive intent of
advertising. 96 All of these developmental characteristics
make these
97
preoperational children "extremely vulnerable" to ads.
In addition to Piaget's stages of development, Roedder grouped
children into similar age groups based specifically on their information
processing abilities. 98 Children seven and younger are typically "limited
processors" who have limited processing skills, are more dependent on
short-term memory, and often have difficulty utilizing mental storage
-99
and retrieval strategies, even when prompted by external cues to do so.
The similarity of both Piaget's and Roedder's research is that children

88. GUNTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 63.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

JOHN, supra note 35, at 17-18; Calvert, supranote 17, at 214.
JOHN, supra note 35, at 18; Calvert, supranote 17, at 214.
Calvert, supra note 17, at 214; see JoHN, supra note 35, at 7.
Calvert, supra note 17, at 217.
JOHN, supra note 35, at 18; BoNI B. REECE ET AL., Selling Food to Children:Is Fun

Part of a BalancedBreakfast?, in ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES

191 (M.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Carole Macklin & Les Carlson eds., 1999); GUNTER ET AL., supra note 4 1, at 64.
Calvert, supra note 17, at 215.
Id. at214-15.
GUNTER ET AL., supranote 41, at 64-65; KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 7.
Calvert, supra note 17, at 215.
GUNTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 31.
Id. at 32; JOHN, supra note 35, at 19.
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start to develop the cognitive ability to understand the intent of ads 00
to
persuade and influence the audience around the age of seven or eight.'
Children in the concrete operational stage (seven to eleven years old)
do not accept perception as reality, can think about stimuli in their
environment in a more thoughtful way, and can consider multiple
dimensions in thoughtful and relatively abstract ways.) 0 ' However, they
still have difficulty with tasks requiring abstract reasoning."' As a
result, children in this stage begin to understand the persuasive intent in
commercials, think abstractly about what they observe, do not focus
solely on certain perceptual features, and are less likely to take ads at
face value. 0 3 However, the ability to recognize persuasive intent "tends
to emerge in only rudimentary form, with youngsters recognizing that
commercials intend to sell, but not necessarily that they are biased
messages which warrant some degree of skepticism."' 0 4 Ithas been
demonstrated that this understanding is linked to a child's cognitive
development and capabilities, rather than mere levels of exposure to
commercials. 10 5 Children's reasoning operates more successfully in
concrete contexts where they can experience or manipulate objects
directly as opposed to situations where they are merely passive
receivers of the medium.' 0 6 As a result, children's reasoning of
television commercials, for example, is likely less developed than their
reasoning in domains where there are significant opportunities for
interaction with the stimuli. 10 7 Under Roedder's model, seven to eleven
year olds are typically "cued processors" who can retrieve stored mental
processing strategies, but only do so if they are prompted by external
cues.108 That is, they do not access these strategies spontaneously.
In the formal operational stage (eleven years to adulthood), children
develop more adult-like thought patterns, and are capable of all aspects
of complex and abstract thought for concrete and hypothetical objects
and situations. 10 9 Children's understanding of advertising around the
age of eleven or twelve is similar to that of adults, with variation
attributable to different experiences rather than cognitive abilities."l 0
Roedder's model classifies twelve year-olds to adults as "strategic
processors," who are able to spontaneously implement various efficient
100. GUNTERETAL.,supra note 41, at 32.

101. JOHN, supranote 35, at 18.
102. GUNTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 66.
103. JOHN, supranote 35, at 18; GUNTER ET AL., supranote 41, at 32.
104. KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 9.

105. Id.
106. GUNTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 66.

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.at 31; JOHN,supra note 35, at 19.
JOHN, supranote 35, at 18; GUNTER ET"AL., supra note 41, at 66.
GUNTERETAL.,supranote41, at 66.
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information, storage, and retrieval techniques, including verbal labeling,
rehearsal, and cue-based memory searches." '
Deborah Roedder John 1 2 also later developed a consumer
socialization model that builds on Piaget's stages, with the "perceptual
stage" referring to three to seven year-olds, the "analytical stage"
referring to ages seven to eleven, and the "reflective stage" referring to
ages eleven to sixteen years. 13 John explained that the perceptual stage
is characterized by limited decision-making skills as consumers, the
analytical stage is characterized by a knowledge of advertiser
techniques and brands, and the reflective stage is characterized by a
mature understanding
of products and marketing practices, including
14
advertiser intent.
D. ChildrenAre Still Defenseless Until They Acquire Advanced
Knowledge & Retrieval Abilities
These theories of childhood development explain why research has
demonstrated that children under the age of eight years are, as the
American Academy of Pediatrics states, "cognitively and
psychologically defenseless against advertising.' 115 Based on these
developmental stages and research, it may seem as though children aged
seven to twelve would have cognitive defenses such as knowledge
about persuasive intent and sketicism about the truthfulness to protect
themselves from advertising. However, recent experimental research
indicates that such defenses fail to have any effect on a child's
preference for a product;" 7 a mere knowledge of advertising's
persuasive intent and a skepticism toward the truthfulness of advertising
in general has little effect on children's preference for the advertised
products at ages eight to fourteen." 8 Rather, a study by Brucks et al.
involving nine and ten year-olds indicates that in order for children to
implement their cognitive defenses regarding persuasive intent and
truthfulness, a "more detailed knowledge about the nature of advertising
and how it works,""19 such as "specific advertising techniques and
111.

JOHN, supra note 35, at 19.

112. Deborah Roedder John was formerly Deborah Roedder; see Calvert, supra note 17, at
215; JOHN, supra note 35, at 15.
113. Calvert, supranote 17, at 215.
114. Id.
115. Comm. on Commc'n, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Children, Adolescents, and
Advertising 18 PEDIATRICS 2563, 2563 (2006), availableat http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/
cgi/reprint/pediatrics;I 18/6/2563.pdf.
116. JOHN, supra note 35, at 12.
117. Id.
118. Id.at 12-13; Brucks et al., supra note 78, at 480-8 1.
119. Brucks et al., supra note 78, at 480-81.
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tricks" that are used, is required.' 20 Studies have found that this more
specific knowledge, including an understanding of advertisers' specific
advertising tactics (such as humor, celebrity endorsers, and product
comparisons), does not develop until children approach eleven to
fourteen years of age. 1 2E At the age of eleven and throughout this
period, such knowledge increases, complementing
the previously
122
developed skepticism, which has already peaked.
Brucks et al. found that even children with such specific knowledge
about advertising still do not spontaneously retrieve this knowledge
during exposure to advertising and, therefore, do not tend to generate
critical thoughts or "counterarguments" to the advertisin 3 thereby
remaining defenseless against the persuasion of advertising.
Rather,
this detailed knowledge of advertising must be cued in order for these
children to access and activate this knowledge regarding advertising
techniques in order to form counterarguments or critical thoughts
against the advertising.' 24 Given that children are not usually "cued"
during ads, older children (seven to eleven years) respond similarly to
younger 12children
and are just as willing to accept the advertising
5
message.

Information processing research suggests that strategic processors
2
aged twelve through adults do not need to be cued, l6-because
they
information
retrieve
to
necessary
skills
the
use
spontaneously
including skepticism, sophisticated knowledge of advertising, and
memories of experiences.128 Even if adults do not always spontaneously
retrieve such information and generate critical thoughts or
counterarguments while watching ads, given their "sophisticated view
of advertising that includes detailed knowledge of selling tactics, [and] a
healthy degree of skepticism regarding advertising,"' 129 their immediate
retrieval of such defenses is likely not necessary. With extensive
knowledge about general product characteristics, such as durability and
differences in price, 30 adults are much more likely to mentally retrieve
their extensive knowledge and skepticism of products before they
actually proceed to make a purchase than are children, who lack this
120. JOHN, supra note 35, at 13-14.

121. Id.
122. Id. at 15-16.

123. Brucks et al., supra note 78, at 480-81; GUNTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 100.
124. See sources cited supra note 123.
125. GUNTER ET AL., supranote 41, at 100.

126. Brucks et al., supra note 78, at 481. Brucks et al. notes however, "this remains to be
empirically verified."
127. Id. at 473.
128. John, supra note 35, at 17.
129. Id.
130. Brucks et al., supra note 78, at 473.
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information. 131 This is simply because with greater knowledge,
experiences, and memories of past purchases and ads, there is a much
greater chance that a spontaneous thought or a natural environmental
cue will naturally activate a related mental defense at some point before
a purchase is made.132 But before age twelve, children typically must be
cued to access their prior knowledge and skepticism of advertising, and
before age eight, cues are ineffective in prompting children to access
any limited knowledge
they may have about advertising that could serve
33
defense.'
a
as
III. CURRENT REGULATION PERMITS POTENTIALLY DECEPTIVE AND
UNFAIR TACTICS

The regulation of advertising based on deceptiveness and unfairness
has previously been controversial. 134 Defining whether certain ads or
advertising tactics are untrue or deceptive "can involve great
disagreement."' 135 For these reasons, this Part discusses why increased
regulation and enforcement of advertising tactics targeted primarily to
children should be considered, as opposed to all advertising for children
or for a particular product category. Such tactics may be more likely to
cause deception than inform the child consumer and may make children
particularly susceptible to an ad and its associated harm. A narrower
approach that targets the more problematic components or tactics of
children's advertising would prioritize issues of greater concern, while
still permitting advertisers to continue to inform consumers with other
less problematic methods.
Section A begins with a discussion of how some organizations have
argued that ads targeting younger children, or for particular product
types, should be considered unfair and deceptive due to a child's
inability to understand the nature and intent of the ads as a whole. The
section then discusses why regulations completely banning ads in these
categories would be difficult. The following four sections discuss
particular advertising tactics that may be deceptive and unfair. These
tactics add to and exacerbate any preexisting problems (i.e., the
potential existence of deceptiveness or unfairness) that may exist in ads
where a child's limited cognitive abilities are targeted.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. JOHN, supranote 35, at 19.
134. David L. Belt, The Standardfor Determining "Unfair Acts or Practices" Under State
Unfair Trade PracticesAct, 80 CONN. B.J. 247, 264 (2006).
135. Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Comparative Study of Public
Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and PrivateLitigation, 20 GA. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1985).
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A. BroaderApproaches in Advertising Regulation
In the late 1970s, after numerous hearings and extensive review of
existing research, 136 the FTC arrived at the conclusion that ads targeting
young children were inherently deceptive and unfair. 13 7 The FTC
proposed a rule banning all advertising for any product to children
younger than eight, and later revised the proposed rule to six years
based on research that children under six were too young to understand
the purpose of advertising.' 38 The proposed rule also planned to ban
advertising targeting children under age twelve for sugared food
products posing the most serious dental health risks. 139 Third, any
permitted ads for sugared food products targeting children less than
twelve years
would require accompanying nutritional or health
140
disclosures.

However, following opposition from the advertising industry and
Congress, the rulemaking proceeding was terminated and the FTC's
regulatory efforts ended with the proposed rules abandoned. 14 1 In its
Final Staff Report, the FTC cited difficulties in finding "workable
solutions" for implementing rules, such as the ineffectiveness of
informational remedies (such as informational disclosures within an ad)
for the cognitively-limited younger children. 142 Other impracticalities,
such as the lack of programs in the 1970s with young children

136.

JEFFREY P. KOPLAN ET AL., INST. OF MED., PREVENTING CHILDHOOD OBESITY 174

(2005).
137. C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Process, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2097,
2154 n. 199 (1992) ("Before stopped by fierce industry opposition, the FTC proposed to prohibit,
as inherently 'deceptive,' all television advertising directed at very young children and to
regulate a variety of other commercial practices such as program length commercials aimed at
somewhat older children."); Comm. on Commc'n, supra note 115, at 2563 ("In fact, in the late
1970s, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) held hearings, reviewed the existing research, and
came to the conclusion that it was unfair and deceptive to advertise to children younger than 6
years.") (citing FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IN THE MATTER OF CHILDREN'S ADVERTISING:
FTC FINAL STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (U.S. Government Printing Office 1981));

KuNKEL ET AL., supranote 24, at 18 ("Drawing upon a comprehensive research review produced
by the National Science Foundation in 1977 (Adler et al., 1977), the FTC developed a 300-page
staff report supporting its position that it was inherently unfair to direct advertising to audiences
too young to recognize the persuasive intent of such messages.") (citing FED. TRADE COMM'N,
FTC STAFF REPORT ON TELEVISION ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN (Washington, DC 1978)); see
JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 6-7.

138. JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 6 n.27; Jess Alderman et al., Application of Law to the
ChildhoodObesity Epidemic, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 90, 98 n. 167 (2007).
139. JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 6.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 7,9-10; Alderman et al., supra note 138, at 98.
142. JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 7, 9-10.
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comprising even 30% of 43the audience, made the effectiveness of
targeted bans questionable. 1
Television programming today, however, is much different than it
was in the late 1970s. Today, "cable and satellite television are available
twenty-four hours a day and entire channels offer programming that is
almost exclusively for children," with the average child viewing over
40,000 television ads a year. 144 Further, advertising in general is much
more pervasive today than it was thirty years ago. For example 1'45back in
2003, 66% of children lived in a home with internet access,
while
98% of children's sites permitted advertising.146 Two-thirds of those
sites relied on advertising for their primary revenue. 147 In addition, in
the late seventies, the FTC also noted that there was little evidence
establishing a link between advertising
and the health concerns at
48
issue-this evidence exists today.1
More recently, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) has
maintained that all ads to children are inherently deceptive, arguing it
exploits children under age eight. 149 The AAP argues these ads are
inherently deceptive because children are unable to fully understand the
persuasive nature of ads, and instead, perceive them as a credible source
of information with no tendency for bias. 150 Similarly, the American
Psychological Association (APA) has made the argument that
advertising to children is deceptive because children do not have the
cognitive defenses against persuasion that adults do. 5 ' Both the AAP
and the APA have also concluded that certain advertising to children is
unfair due to the health risks as well as other harms. 152 Despite the
opposition the FTC received in the late seventies, in its Final Report, the
FTC maintained their position regarding the nature of children's
advertising, and "intentionally crafted its final report with an eye toward
143. Starek, supra note 2, paras. 13-15; JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 7, 9-10.
144. Alderman et al., supra note 138, at 97.
145. MOORE, supra note 71, at 29.
146. Id. at 1.
147. Id.
148. JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 11; see infra Part IV (discussing health problems linked to
advertising).
149.

THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN CHILDHOOD OBESITY 8

(2004), available at http://www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/The-Role-Of-Media-in-ChildhoodObesity.pdf ("The American Academy of Pediatrics reviewed the research about children and
advertising and concluded that 'advertising directed toward children is inherently deceptive and
exploits children under 8 years of age."'); see also Dennis Crouch, The Social Welfare of
Advertising to Children, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 179, 193-94 (2002) (citing American
Academy of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Children, Adolescents, and Television, 95 PEDIATRICS
295, 295 (1995)).
150. Crouch, supra note 149, at 182, 193-94; KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 8.
151. KUNKEL ET AL., supranote 24, at 21.
152. Id. at 22; see Comm. on Commc'n, supra note 115, at 2563, 2566.
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action would be re-attempted."' ' 53
the future and a time when regulatory
154
That time for change may be now.
Whether the nature of all persuasive advertising alone inherently5
amounts to a "material" level of deception in children is unclear.'
Even if it does, the FTC would likely face similar opposition if a
complete ban on children's advertising were again proposed, not only
due to advertisers' desires to reach children, but because of the
56
constitutional protections that may make such a ban questionable.'
With respect to advertising to consumers in general, it has been said that
outside of Utopia, deceptive meanings cannot be cost-effectively
prevented and cannot be eliminated unless all advertising were to be
banned. 157 However, complete bans on commercial speech are generally
disfavored, 158 and ads can only be banned as deceptive if they are more
likely to deceive children than inform them. 159 It is unlikely that all
persuasive advertising to children would be declared
deceptive
60
regardless of the specific advertising tactics utilized.
Similarly, given the requirement that regulations of unfair
advertising must be narrowly tailored, complete bans on advertising
certain products or advertising to certain age groups may face difficult
scrutiny as being overly extensive in advancing the government's
interest. 1 The Supreme Court has previously struck down bans meant
to shield children from unfair advertising where such bans also kept
commercial speech from adults. 162
In sum, although other countries have imposed bans,' 63 any
restrictions on advertising to young children must be narrowly tailored,
given the constitutional protections of speech.' 64 For instance,
regulations involving ads that target and reach both children and a
significant proportion of adults, such as ads for pizza, ice cream, or
153. Alderman et al., supra note 138, at 98.
154. See id. ("That time may be rapidly approaching.").
155. See Best, supra note 135, at 6-7.
156. See Part VI.C ("[T]he government may ban forms of communication more likely to
deceive the public than to inform it."); KOPLAN ET AL., supra note 136, at 174-75 ("[I]t was
found that it would be difficult to develop a workable rule that would address the concerns
without infringing on First Amendment rights.").
157. BeVier, supra note 63, at 14.
158. JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 14 (citing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,
534-36 (2001)).
159. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980); see Part VI.C.
160. See infra Part VI.C (discussing the constitutionality of regulation).
161. See infra Part VI.C (discussing the constitutionality of regulation).
162. JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 14 (citing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,
534-36 (2001)).
163. See infra Part V.C.
164. See discussion infra Part VI.C.
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macaroni and cheese, must still allow advertisers to convey information
that is truthful to adults. 165 Similarly, the restrictions must avoid
blocking other truthful speech to child. However, such truthful
communication can be limited to the extent it does not unduly impinge
on the advertiser's ability to propose a transaction
and the adult
166
listener's opportunity to gain product information.
For these reasons, increased regulation or enforcement that targets
specific tactics or aspects of children's ads, rather than complete bans
on advertising for certain age groups or products-as was originally
considered in the 1970s-should be considered. 67 These advertising
tactics build upon and exacerbate any inherent levels of deceptiveness
(whether determined to be legally material or immaterial) or unfairness
that research and various organizations, including the FTC in the past,
have argued exists in the advertising of certain products or all
advertising to children. 168 Such ads use particular tactics to further
capitalize on a child's lack of cognitive skills to process their ads and
169
amplify a child's inability to critically evaluate advertising in general.
The specific regulation of such deceptive and unfair tactics could occur
while allowing the communication of product information through the
use of other tactics which only pose the limited threats associated with a
child's inability to process advertising in general.
B. Puffery
One of the large concerns regarding misleading and unfair tactics
70
used by advertisers stems from the use of puffery or exaggeration.'
Puffery represents the advertiser's opinions about the qualities of the
product or brand and are therefore difficult to verify.'17 According to
the Fifth Circuit, puffery comes in "two possible forms: (1) an
exaggerated, blustering, and boasting statement upon which no
reasonable buyer would be justified in relying; or (2) a general claim of
superiority over comparable products that is so vague that it can be
understood as nothing more than a mere expression of opinion." 172 The
FTC has defined puffery as "an expression of opinion not made as a
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
evaluate
170.

See discussion infra Part VI.C.
See discussion infra Part VI.C.
See supraPart III.A.
Best, supranote 135, at 10-11; see JENNNGS,supra note 3, at 6-7.
KOPLAN ET AL., supra note 136, at 173-74 (discussing children's inability to critically
advertising).
GuNTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 20.

171. Id.at20.
172. Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir. 2000). Puffery
has also been defined as "an exaggeration or overstatement expressed in broad, vague, and
commendatory language." Castrol, Inc. v Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 945 (3d Cir. 1993).
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representation of fact."'1 7 3 That is, products cannot be misrepresented or
alleged to have benefits they do not.' 74 Furthermore, a statement cannot
be characterized as mere puffery if it is made with the purpose of
deceiving prospective purchasers.
Examples of puffery include such phrases as "They're
GRRRRRREAT!," "the best," or "better than," all of which can be
subjective and misleading to children.' 76 As a result, even adults can be
unsure of their meaning. 177 Puffery is considered a non-actionable
statement of general opinion under the Lanham Act's section 43(a), the
false advertising provision. 178 In accordance with this provision, a
number of claims of false advertising involving such opinionated claims
are usually held to be non-actionable puffery. For instance, in Pizza
Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held the slogan
"Better Ingredients. Better Pizza." to be indisputably a "general
statement of opinion regarding the superiority of its product over all
others" that "epitomizes the exaggerated advertising, blustering, and
boasting by a manufacturer upon which no consumer would reasonably
rely."' 179 The court cited two other cases involving the "puffing" of a
video game console and ice cream.' 80 Ads for pizza, video game
systems, and ice cream undoubtedly target both adults and children.
While adults do not need protection from puffery, current enforcement
1 81
and regulation fail to provide the necessary protection to children.'
Children under eight frequently accept advertising claims at face
value, 182 and therefore perceive such puffery as truthful, factual
statements, rather than disputable opinion. Without specific knowledge
of advertising or the ability to retrieve that knowledge, children are
unable to understand puffery and other product-enhancing
173. F.T.C. v. U.S. Sales Corp., 785 F. Supp. 737, 746 (N.D. I1., 1992) (citing Deception
Policy Statement, 103 F.T.C. 174, 181 n.42, appended to In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103
F.T.C. 110, 176 (1984)).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176.
177.
178.
179.

GuNTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 20.
Id.
Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489,498 (5th Cir. 2000).
Id.

180. Id. InAtari Corp. v. 3DO Co., the manufacturer's slogan that its gaming console was
"the most advanced home gaming system in the universe" was held to be non-actionable
puffery, 1994 WL 723601, *2 (N.D. Cal. 1994), just as in a case involving a manufacturer's
claim that its ice cream maker was "better" than that of its competitor. Nikkal Indus., Ltd. v.
Salton, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1227, 1234 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
181. In the three cases involving pizza, a video gaming system, and ice cream, there was no
discussion of a child's perspective, but simply cited the leading commentaries and case law
referring to the "reasonable buyer," "consumers," and "reasonable man." Pizza Hut, 227 F.3d at
498; Nikkal Indus., 735 F.Supp.at 1234 n.3; Atari Corp., 1994 WL 723601 at *2.
182. Comm. on Commc'n, supra note 115, at 2563.
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techniques. 183 Numerous study groups and parents similarly believe that
children are ill equipped. 184 Current enforcement seems to exempt these
statements that, from the perspective of a reasonable child consumer,
are misleading and arguably false. Given that advertisers are well aware
of the cognitive limitations of children, it could be said that certain
exaggerations, boasting, and general claims of superiority are made with
the purpose of deceiving children into believing that such claims are
literally true, and therefore, although characterized as puffery to adults,
should not receive protection as puffery to children. 185 Where ads
primarily target children, regulation and enforcement should take a
closer look at advertisers' statements from the true perspective of a
child as well as the advertiser's purpose in making those statements.
Certain instances of what has previously received a free pass as puffery
could potentially reach a material level of deception and be unfair to
children.
C. Ineffective Disclaimers & Disclosures
While disclaimers or disclosures may be able to compensate for
some potential deception or unfairness toward adults, research has
demonstrated that children often have difficulty comprehending the
intended meaning of most disclaimers.' 86 Studies have shown, for
example, that only 25% of kindergarten through second graders (four to
eight year olds) could grasp the meaning of standard toy disclaimers,
such as "some assembly required" during a commercial, while "the use
of child-friendly language such as 'you have to put it together' more
than doubled the proportion of children who understood the qualifying
message."' 87 Other examples of such disclaimers that children do not
understand include, "batteries not included," "each part sold
separately,"' 88 and "part of a balanced breakfast.', 189 A 1992 study
similarly found that although "balanced breakfast" disclaimers were
common in ads for breakfast cereals to combat the concern that sugary
breakfast cereals hold little nutritional value, most children under seven
years have no idea what "balanced breakfast" means.' 90 Instead, the
183. Brucks et al., supra note 78, at 480-81.
184. GUNTER ET AL., supranote 41, at 20.

185. See supra text accompanying note 175 ("Furthermore, a statement cannot be
characterized as mere puffery if it is made with the purpose of deceiving prospective
purchasers.").
186. GUNTER ET AL., supranote 41, at 20; KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 5.
187. KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 5 (citing studies from 1977 and 2002).
188. Id. Other variations, such as "assembly necessary" and "batteries required" are also
ineffective. SCHOR, supra note 40, at 66.
189. GUNTER ET AL., supranote 41, at 20.
190. KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 5.
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phrase actually misleads children into believing that cereal alone is
sufficient for a meal' 91 or that it is required as a necessary part of a
balanced breakfast.' 92 Employing creative terminology in advertising in
an effort to obscure certain negative information about a93product "is a
long-standing practice that often misleads the consumer."'
Overall, while many disclaimers may seem to address certain aspects
of unfair and deceptive ads targeting children, most are actually
ineffective. Current enforcement and regulation activities regarding
disclaimers are evidently not strict enough and require modification.
Comprehension of such disclaimers can be improved through the use of
more child-friendly language as well as concurrent visual images and
audio messages clearly illustrating the meaning of the disclaimer.' 94 In
addition, larger text, large images, and additional time required for
disclaimers would likely increase comprehension. Such regulation is
necessary because, where a disclaimer can convert potentially deceptive
speech into nondeceptive speech, it is generally preferred over an
outright ban of the speech.' 9 This is because "[t]he First Amendment
permits courts to enjoin false commercial96speech only to the extent
necessary to prevent consumer confusion."'
D. Cartoons & Fantasy Worlds
Fantasy situations, settings, and characters are frequently used 1in
97
advertising and can possibly mislead and be unfair to young children.
Children younger than eight tend to accept what they perceive to be
reality. 9 8 Therefore, these children are deceived into believing that the
fantasies and worlds presented in ads are real.199 These children believe
that imaginary characters and events actually exist due to their animistic
thinking.
Furthermore, in interactive ads, such as online
advergaming, children younger than eight may likely believe they are
191. Id.
192. GUNTER ET AL., supranote 41, at 20.
193. KUNKEL ET AL., supranote 24, at 5.

194. Research has also shown that disclaimers presented in audio and visual format are
more effective than the common audio or visual only approach. GUNTER ET AL., supra note 41, at
20.
195. In re R.J.M., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); Consumer's Union of U.S., Inc. v. Gen.
Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Bruce P. Keller, "It Keeps Going and
Going and Going": The Expansion of False Advertising Litigation Under the Lanham Act, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 156 (1996).

196. Keller, supranote 195 (quoting Tambrands, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 673 F. Supp.
1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
197.
198.
199.
200.

GUNTER ET AL.,supra note 41, at 21.
JoHN, supranote 35, at 18; Calvert, supra note 17, at 214.
Calvert, supra note 17, at 214, 222; GUmTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 21.
Calvert, supra note 17, at 214.
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really interacting with the branded characters. 20 1 Nine out of ten cereal
commercials make use of fantasy techniques, and such situations are
frequently used in food advertising in general.20 2 Given that the
advertising of cereals to children occupy an overwhelmingly 40% of
advertising, 20 3 examples of such characters is unnecessary.
The use of fantasy characters and fantasy settings is certainly
effective in targeting children. Research has demonstrated that
children's intake of a particular food increased by 28% if the product
was branded with a recognizable character. 20 4 In this study, broccoli
was squared off against a chocolate bar.20 5 When no characters were on
the products, the chocolate won the hearts of 78% of the children versus
22% for broccoli. 20 6 Yet when an Elmo sticker was placed on the
broccoli and an unknown character was placed on the chocolate, the
score was an even split at 50% each, strongly suggesting that "popular
characters in the media can have an increasingly powerful impact on
children's healthy habits. 20 7 This research was conducted by the
Sesame Workshop to determine the role that such characters could play
in increasing the appeal of healthy foods.20 8 In addition, the Sesame
Workshop research similarly indicates that utilizing recognizable
characters for unhealthy20 foods
or other products are equally influential
9
over children's choices.

McDonald's famous trademarked clown Ronald McDonald easily
comes to mind as another recognizable fantasy character. Indeed,
Ronald is recognized by a staggering 96% of all American school
children regardless of race or income, ranking only behind Santa Claus
amongst all fictional characters. 210 McDonald's spends more money on
marketing and advertising than any other brand 211 and the efforts clearly
have an impact on children.
201. Id. at 216.
202. GUNTER ET AL., supranote 41, at 21.
203. SCHOR, supra note 40, at 120.

204. Press Release, Sesame Workshop, "If Elmo Eats Broccoli, Will Kids Eat it Too?"
Atkins Foundation Grant to Fund Further Research (Sept. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Sesame
Workshop] available at http://archive.sesameworkshop.org/aboutus/inside_press.php?contentld
=15092302.

205. Id.
206. Id,
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Amanda L. Willette, Where Have All the ParentsGone?: Do Efforts to Regulate Food
Advertising to Curb Childhood Obesity Pass ConstitutionalMuster?, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 561,566
(2007).
211. Lee J. Munger, Comment, Is Ronald McDonald the Next Joe Camel? Regulating Fast
Food Advertisements Targeting Children in Light of the American Overweight and Obesity
Epidemic, 3 CONN. PUB.INTEREST L.J. 456, 466 (2004).
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Children and consumers in general have been shown to "transfer
feelings about advertising, packaging, and trademarks to the product
itself."212 A study by Robinson et al. demonstrated that identical foods
taste better to children simply when wrapped in a McDonald's wrapper,
and children with more exposure to McDonald's advertising prefer the
brand-wrapped food even more. 2 13 This was the case not only for the
typical hamburgers and French fries, but also for healthy foods-like
214
carrots, which are not even marketed or available from McDonald's.
It is clear that advertising utilizing fantasy worlds and characters can
have significant impacts on the minds of young children. The evidence
that such advertising can take over the minds of children and cause
them to believe an identical product is preferable simply because of the
brand, offers support for the regulation or ban of marketing toward
children.21 5 While adult consumers may also make purchasing decisions
according to a brand name, the ad's claims or the appeal of a cartoon
character will not be the primary basis upon which an adult consumer
initially makes their product choice. This is because adults have
cognitive defenses such as skepticism and a wealth of information and
experience available to them.
Children will accept advertising claims at face value whereas adults
will initially look at the larger picture of their knowledge and
experience. Accordingly, the use of such cartoon characters and fantasy
worlds is arguably deceptive to children because children's minds are
targeted at a young age when they still believe such fantasy characters
and worlds are real. These reasonable child consumers are influenced in
a misleading, material way that is likely to influence their purchasing
decisions. In addition, they do not have an understanding of advertisers'
persuasive intent, meaning they also lack cognitive defenses against the
use of such tactics that could help to diminish the effectiveness of any
deception. Further, these tactics are arguably unfair because they may
result in purchasing behaviors that are likely to ultimately cause the
consumer harms that are not reasonably avoidable. 21 6 Ultimately, these
tactics allow advertisers to stake-out their own influential worlds of
"make-believe" in children's minds for the rest of their lives, even long
after children no longer believe in fantasy worlds or characters.
212. Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: TrademarkLaw and Cognitive Science,
86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 514 (2008).
213. See Thomas N. Robinson et al., Effects of Fast Food Branding on Young Children's
Taste Preferences, 161 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 792, 794-95 (2007)
(examining the effects of exposure to McDonald's and McDonald's advertising on three to five
year olds and their preferences of identical foods when wrapped in McDonald's packaging
versus identical but unbranded packaging).
214. Id.at 794.
215. See id.at 796.
216. See infraPartlV.
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E. More: Endorsements, Special Effects, Extraneous Footage,and
Overall Themes
Celebrity endorsements also have a significant impact on children
and enhance the child's liking of the product. 217 Studies have also
shown that children feel validated when they choose a product that is
endorsed. 218 "Celebrity" endorsements may include famous animated
characters that grace the packaging of products, or endorse the products
in commercials. 21 9 For example, characters from Nickelodeon's hit
programs "SpongeBob SquarePants" and the "Rugrats" have been used
to endorse a number of products, such as macaroni and cheese, ice
cream, and bubble gum.22 Children also believe that endorsers, which
can even include cartoons such as Fred Flintstone, are credible sources
of information regarding a product and its characteristics, such as
nutritional information. 22T The misleading and deceptive nature of these
advertising tactics to children who do not understand the intent and
advertising techniques of companies is clear. Younger children, who
perceive such ads to be truthful, are persuaded into believing certain
products are actually used by their endorsers, and that the use of
products will make them run faster, jump higher, have more fun, be
healthier, or simply become more popular amongst their peers.
Special effects, such as slow motion, are commonly used in
children's ads. For example, slow motion is often used in toy ads
targeting boys to accentuate a particular feature, such as the ability to
perform some feat in midair, despite the fact that the child will never
again be able to observe the feat in this manner.22 2 Such special effects
convey an unrealistic expectation about what the child will experience
when the feat actually occurs. Children do not realize this and are,
therefore, misled and deceived to some extent. Other special effects
include fast motion, transforming objects, appearances and
217. Brucks et al., supra note 78, at 472; KUNKEL ET AL., supranote 24, at 10.
218. GUNTERETAL., supra note 41, at23.
219. See id; KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 10.
220. Susan Linn & Josh Golin, Beyond Commercials: How Food Marketers Target
Children, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 13, 18-19 (2006); see also MOORE, supra note 71, at 17, 19.
221. See GUNTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 23.
222. See, e.g., Television Commercial, Neff Magstrike Dart Tag Commercial (posted to
YouTube on Jan. 13, 2009) (Hasbro 2008) (indicating in a written disclaimer at 0:15 and 0:20
seconds that slow motion is used), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
kujj6wWQXSc; see also Television Commercial, Neff Dart Tag Strikefire Commercial (posted
Nov. 10, 2008) (Hasbro 2007) (indicating slow motion use at 0:12 and 0:23 seconds), available
at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aOScU472EiU&feature=PlayList&p=D60197F45EB62D
43&index=40&playnext=-3&playnext-from=PL; Television Commercial, Neff Disc Shot
Commercial (Post Nov. 10, 2008) (Hasbro 2007) (indicating slow motion used at 0:13, 0:18, and
0:20 seconds), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BPp8VUxPbws&feature=
related.
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disappearances, distortion, sound effects, animated characters
interacting with real children and other editing tricks.223 Furthermore,
the use of various camera angles, perspectives and framing techniques
convey additional misleading and deceptive messages to children, such
as the dimensions of the product or the physical achievements of which
it is capable.224
Extraneous footage that fails to show the actual product and tries to
suggest that the consumer is going to experience a more entertaining
product is arguably misleading and deceptive to children. Such footage
often depicts unrealistic environments, added props, and added products
that are not included with the featured product. This footage, such as
actual cars in a toy car ad, can be influential to children 2N and may
similarly be deceptive and misleading for obvious reasons.
Finally, for many ads, the overall themes are problematic. For
instance, with most cereal ads, there is little focus on the product
itself.226 Instead, the overwhelming theme conveyed to children is that
they should "eat certain foods because they taste 'magically delicious'
and they will help bring fun and excitement to [their] life, not because
they fulfill [their] body's needs." 227 While there may be a brief mention
of certain nutritional information, the primary message is that "foods
taste chocolately or fruity and they help you have fun. ' 228 Children
focus on these messages because they dominate
the ad and are the
229
impression.
an
leave
to
likely
most
message
F. Summary
Current regulation fails to protect children against a number of
tactics that are arguably misleading, deceptive and unfair. Ultimately,
the lack of enforcement and regulation has led to an overwhelming use
of such tactics and has negatively affected the social well-being of
children. A closer examination of these arguably deceptive techniques is
warranted, especially given the FTC's prior position that all advertising
to young children is deceptive and the maintenance of its position
despite the decision to forego implementation of its late 1970s

223. See id. at 23-24.

224. See, e.g., Television Commercial, Transformers--Revenge of the Fall TVC (posted
May 22, 2009) (2009 Hasbro) (utilizing a variety of low camera angles and tight, close-up shots
that give the impression that the figurines are larger than they actually are), available at

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LF52pbNOA94&feature--related.
225. Brucks et al., supra note 78, at 472.
226. See REECE ET AL., supra note 93, at 207.
227. Id.

228. Id. at 206.
229. Id.
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proposal.230 Regulation of such tactics would be more feasible than a
complete ban of children's advertising, as was previously considered.
IV. THE HARM TO CHILDREN

The literally false, deceptive or misleading, and unfair children's
advertising with insufficient regulation is ultimately harmful to children.
Children are being deceived into choosing products that are not in their
best interest, and products that they likely would not choose if they were
provided with, and actually understood, all the information. While
adults are also deceived into purchasing products or services that are not
always in their best interests or fail to meet their expectations, the
pervasiveness of the harm to children is surely much greater, given their
limited cognitive abilities, their lack of adequate defenses, and the
vulnerability of their young developing minds and bodies.
In children aged six to seventeen, obesity rates have increased at
alarming rates in recent years,23 ' with rates doubling to 15.3% (for six
to eleven year olds) and tripling to 15.5% (for adolescents) since
1980.232 According the Surgeon General, "obesity is at an epidemic
level in the United States., 233 Although the nutritional information on
product packaging has increased over the years, 234 the amount of
advertising targeting children has also risen dramatically, from
approximately $100 million by all corporate advertisers in 1983 to $10
235
billion to $12 billion per year by food and beverage industries alone.
The dramatic increases in advertising and obesity rates do not seem to
be mere correlation. 236 Rather, numerous studies by well-respected
organizations all point to a link between childhood obesity and
advertising targeting children. 237 Most importantly, recent evidence,
using a number of statistical models, was able to directly link childhood
obesity rates to the amount of time children spent viewing ads.238 The
study found that children who view more fast food television
230.
231.
232.
233.

See supra Part III.A.
REECEETAL.,supra note 93, at 189.

Linn & Golin, supra note 220, at 13-14.
Crouch, supra note 149, at 179.

234. REECE ET AL., supra note 93, at 189.

235. Linn & Golin, supra note 220, at 14, 31-32; see also Robinson et al., supra note 213,
at 792 (indicating United States spending figures).
236. Linn & Golin, supra note 220, at 13-14.
237. Id. (citing studies by the World Health Organization, the Kaiser Family Foundation,
the British Food Commission, and the Institutes of Medicine).
238. Roni Caryn Rabin, TV Ads Contribute to Childhood Obesity, Economists Say, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21/health/research/
2 lobesity.html?_r=1

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLA W & POLICY

[Vol. 14

commercials had a higher risk of obesity. 239 Obesity in turn, often leads
to other diseases, complications, and medical problems for children.24 °
V. CURRENT REGULATION DOES NOT OFFER CLEAR OR
ADEQUATE PROTECTION

A. The Lanham Act Offers Insufficient Protection
1. Establishing a Section 43(a)(1)(B) Claim
To establish a section 43(a)(1)(B) false advertising claim based on a
false or misleading representation, the plaintiff must show five
elements:
(1) that the defendant has made false or misleading statements as
to his own product [or another's]; (2) that there is actual
deception or at least a tendency to deceive a substantial portion of
the intended audience; (3) that the deception is material in that it
239. Id.
240. Linn & Golin, supra note 220, at 13-14 (indicating "overweight children are at risk for
a number of medical problems, including hypertension, asthma, and Type 2 diabetes-a disease
previously found primarily in adults"); Crouch, supra note 149, at 179 n.3 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE SURGEON GENERAL'S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND
DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY 2001 tbl.1 (2001) (listing the health risks associated with
obesity as including "an increased risk of premature death, type II diabetes, heart disease, stroke,
hypertension, gallbladder disease, osteoarthritis, sleep apnea, asthma, breathing problems,
cancer, high blood cholesterol levels, complications of pregnancy, menstrual irregularities,
hirsutism, stress incontinence, increased surgical risk, [and] psychological disorders . . . [and]
difficulties")). In addition to obesity and the associated health risks, there are other potential
harms that could be deemed substantial in children's advertising, such as the fostering of
insecurity and materialistic behavior in children. As one former advertising agency executive
stated,
[A]dvertising at its best is making people feel that without their product, you're
a loser. Kids are very sensitive to that. If you tell them to buy something, they
are resistant, but if you tell them that they'll be a dork if they don't, you've got
their attention. You open up emotional vulnerabilities and it's very easy to do
with kids because they're the most emotionally vulnerable.
SCHOR, supra note 40, at 25. Although most advertising agencies would not openly support such
a statement, advertising undeniably impacts a child's mental well-being. Id. at 65. In addition to
fostering insecurity, the harmful effects of advertising on children's materialistic nature have
also been demonstrated and discussed. See KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 2-3; William A.
Ramsey, Note, Rethinking Regulation of Advertising Aimed at Children, 58 FED. COMM. L.J.
361, 369 (2006). However, this Article will not explore these psychological harms as closely,
given that the clear physical harms of obesity and the consequent health effects discussed are of
greater significance to a child's well-being.
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is likely to influence purchasing decisions; (4) that the advertised
goods traveled in interstate commerce; and (5) that there is a
likelihood of injury to the plaintiff in terms of declining sales,
loss of good will, etc.241
To be actionable as a false advertising claim under section
43(a)(1)(B), a representation can either be (1) literally false or (2)
implicitly false--deceptive or misleading in context.242 If a challenged
representation is proven literally false, the advertising may be presumed
deceptive and the court need not consider whether the ad actually
misled the public.243 Whether a claim is deceptive or misleading
depends on the message that is conveyed to consumers, meaning that
consumer
survey evidence
consu
er srvey
44 demonstrating that consumers were misled
or deceived is crucial. 2 In other words, the falsity must be material,
such that it could reasonably be expected to influence consumers'
purchasing decisions.245
Under current case law, it is not clear if the courts would apply a
reasonable child consumer standard to section 43(a)(1)(B), but it seems
likely, given that such a standard has been applied to infringement
claims under section 43(a)(1)(A) as well as the Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 102. 246 More importantly, one of the typical factors applied to
241. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Breathasure, Inc., 204 F.3d 87, 91-92 (3d Cir. 2000); see
also United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1179-80 (8th Cir. 1998).
242. Breathasure,Inc., 204 F.3d at 96; United Industries, 140 F.3d at 1182.
243. Breathasure,Inc., 204 F.3d at 92 (citing Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm.
Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc. 19 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1990)).
244. Id.; see also UnitedIndus., 140 F.3d at 1182.
245. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F2d 914, 922 (3d Cir. 1990)
(citing Toro Co. v. Textron, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 241, 251 (Del. 1980)); Cook, Perkiss & Liehe,
Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 244 (9th Cir. 1990).
246. Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 803-04 (4th Cit. 2001).
The Lyons court applied a reasonable child standard in its application of the likelihood of
confusion analysis regarding infringement claims under Lanham Act section 43(a)(A), 15
U.S.C. §§ 1125(a)(1)(A) and Lanham Act section 32, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114. Id. In such claims, the
plaintiff alleges that the defendant infringed the plaintiff's mark through activity "likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a)(l)(A). The standard
was also applied to the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102. Lyons, 243 F.3d at 803. The claims
were brought against a costume rental company who was deemed to be in violation of trademark
and copyright laws by renting out look-alike "Barney" dinosaur costumes. Id. The Lyons court
stated, "the similarity of child-oriented works must be viewed from the perspective of the child
audience for which the products were intended," even where the purchaser is an adult. Id. at 802
(citing Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 1990)). See also Basic Fun,
Inc. v. X-Concepts, LLC, 157 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("The use of [the
Defendant's] name and logo on BFI's packaging as a sponsor implies sponsorship of the
miniature skateboards themselves, which is confusing to the public, many of whom are young
children with a concomitant lower level of consumer sophistication."); Aliotti v. R. Dakin &
Co., 831 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying the standard to the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §
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a section 43(a)(1)(B) claim is "actual deception, or at least a tendency to
deceive a substantial portion of the intended audience., 247 Thus, it
seems a court would likely find children to be the intended audience.
2. Potential Section 43(a)(1)(B) Claims Against the Discussed
Advertising Tactics
Due to the vulnerability of children, a reasonable child consumer
standard should and likely would be applied to section 43(a)(1)(B)
claims where advertising targets children. 8 Assuming such a standard
would be applied, courts should consider the results of the discussed
research demonstrating the true cognitive perspective of children. Under
such a standard, the discussed advertising tactics, such as cartoon
characters, fantasy worlds, celebrity endorsements, special effects,
extraneous props, and puffery, could potentially be found literally false,
or deceptive and misleading in certain contexts.
For instance, although puffery is recognized by adults as mere
opinion, it is perceived as truthful fact by children. Given that young
children do not question advertisers' credibility and accept such claims
as fact, such exaggerations could be considered literally false.
Advertisers are also aware of young children's perception of fantasy
worlds and cartoon characters as reality, and because the existence of
such characters and places are not truthful fact, such representations are
arguably, literally false. Advertisers provide no understandable
disclosure to children that the worlds, characters, claims, beliefs, and
reactions they observe do not actually exist in reality. Thus, because
these techniques that target children are used without any
understandable disclosure, they are effectively, literally false to a
reasonable child consumer.
102 and stating, "[b]ecause children are the intended market for the dolls, we must filter the
intrinsic inquiry through the perception of children."). Some state courts have more clearly
indicated that a reasonable child standard will apply to state false advertising claims. See, e.g.,
Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 492-93 (Cal. App. 2003).
Where advertising is aimed at a particularly susceptible audience, such as the
preschool children targeted by the advertisements in Committee on Children's
Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., [197 Cal. Rptr. 783 (Cal. 1983)
(involving a class action against cereal advertisers under § 17500 of the
California Business & Professions Code for false advertising)] its truthfulness
must be measured by the impact it will likely have on members of that group,
not others to whom it was not primarily directed.
Id. at 494.
247. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., 19
F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1990).
248. See discussion infra Part V.A.
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Even if the advertising techniques targeting children are not
"literally false," they do "convey a false impression, are misleading in
context, or [are] likely to deceive [children] consumers, ' '249 thereby
meeting the first element under the false or deceptive advertising prong
of the Lanham Act, which is a false statement of fact. 250 The second
element, a tendency to deceive a substantial segment of the targeted
audience, 25 1 could surely be met where children are the primary targets,
considering the results from studies discussed in this Article. Third, the
deception is arguably material, as advertising utilizing such techniques
has been shown to influence purchasing decisions. 252 It has been shown
that children's nagging can strongly influence their parents and many
parents give in to such requests.'
As much as "100 percent of the
parents" in another study agreed that their children have a major
influence on their food and snack purchases. 254 The fourth element
would be met by those products in interstate commerce. 255 Finally, the
fifth element would need to be established by a competitor who was
injured by a diversion of sales or loss of goodwill. Despite the potential
success of such claims, few have been brought.
3. Why Few Claims Have Been Brought Under Section 43(a)(1)(B)
While there is a possibility that such claims could be successful and
protect children from the advertising tactics, it is apparent from the fact
that such advertising still exists and the surveys of children discussed
above regarding the deceptiveness of advertising 256 that the Lanham Act
has yet to effectively provide protection. For example, as mentioned 7
nine out of ten cereal advertisers continue to utilize fantasy worlds,25
and a similar percentage undoubtedly use cartoon characters in these
fantasy worlds. Similarly, puffery continues to dominate children's
advertising, with catch phrases such as, "They're magically delicious,"
249. United Indus., 140 F.3d at 1180; see also Breathasure, Inc., 204 F.3d at 91-92
(providing the elements of a false advertising claim).
250. Breathasure,Inc., 204 F.3d at 91; see also UnitedIndus., 140 F.3d at 1180.
251. Breathasure,Inc., 204 F.3d at 92; see also United Indus., 140 F.3d at 1180. Some
courts require evidence of actual consumer deception if the plaintiff seeks damages, while a
plaintiff who merely seeks an injunction need only show evidence of a tendency to deceive.
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 768 (2d ed.
2007) (citing Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 497-98 (5th Cir. 2000).
252. See KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 14-15.
253. See GUNTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 111. Focus groups are regularly run on children
as young as five years, due to the widespread effects of children's pestering on their parents'
spending. Id.
254. SCHOR, supranote 40, at 24.

255. Breathasure,Inc., 204 F.3d at 92.
256. See Part II.B.
257. GUNTER ET AL., supranote 41, at 21.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW & POLICY

[Vol. 14

and "They're GRRREEAT!," serving as two well known examples.
Considering children's cognitive abilities, the advertising tactics are
2 58
arguably in violation of section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act.
However, there does not appear to be any clear case law involving
products targeted primarily to children and involving the tactics
discussed here, 259 such as cartoon characters, fantasy worlds, celebrity
endorsements, special effects, extraneous footage and props, disclaimers
that children do not understand, and the use of puffery. The
258. Lanham Trademark Act § 43 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). The Act provides:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
Id.
259. The few section 43(a)(1)(B) decisions that exist involving products primarily targeting
children do not explicitly apply a reasonable child consumer standard. See EFS Mktg., Inc. v.
Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 487, 492 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that a misrepresentation on the
bottom of a "Troll Doll's" foot was not very likely to influence consumer purchasing decisions,
and therefore was not false advertising); Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2002)
(finding the defendant committed false advertising due to misdescription, because the seller
listed stuffed animal dolls that were not manufactured by trademark holder, such as "Planet
Plush" and "Rothschild Bears," under the caption "Other Beanies" on its web site); Basic Fun,
Inc. v. X-Concepts, LLC, 157 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (false advertising and
trademark infringement claims involving the use of another company's names and logos in
marketing miniature "finger" skateboards); Playskool, Inc. v. Prod. Dev. Group, Inc., 699 F.
Supp. 1056, 1060 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding a claim found on the defendant's packaging that
defendant's toy construction system "attaches to" plaintiffs brand of toy construction system
was false due to the implication that the toys could be safely intermingled with all pieces from
plaintiffs set). However, these claims all involved false advertising on the product itself, the
product packaging, or at the point of sale. Thus, it is possible that the children were not directly
affected by the advertising in some of these cases, because they may not have been the
purchasers. The X-Concepts court, did apply a reasonable child standard to its likelihood of
confusion analysis with respect to trademark infringement, but it was unclear if this test was also
applied to the false advertising claim. X-Concepts, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 457. It is likely however,
that it was applied. The claims in these four cases were also based on more traditional claims of
false advertising brought in the past, such as misdescription or improper use of a competitor's
mark, rather than the types of problematic advertising tactics discussed here, and accordingly,
do not offer much insight as to how a court would rule on the tactics discussed here.
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overwhelming existence of the discussed advertising tactics in such ads
to date, and the apparent lack of suits combating such practices, makes
it clear that while the Lanham Act may provide advertisers with
sufficient protection, it does not offer adequate protection to the child
consumer.
There are likely many reasons why it has not been effective.
Consumers do not have standing to bring a claim under section 43(a).26 °
The courts have held that section 43(a) is exclusively meant to protect
commercial entities from the unscrupulous conduct of their
competitors. 261 Competitors, however, do not always have great
incentive to sue. This is because the fifth element of competitive
"injury" may be difficult to show, 2 62 there is no rush to help third-party
competitors who choose not to take on the expensive litigation
themselves, and the filing of a suit would likely spark counterclaims or
retaliatory suits for similar advertising techniques that would
counterbalance the original claim. That is, advertisers competing for the
child consumers have little incentive, if any, to challenge the legality of
the tactics that are used so pervasively by the advertising industry to
target children. For example, it would make little sense for one
advertiser to bring a claim against a competitor and challenge the use of
a fantasy world or its accompanying cartoon character, when the
263
advertisers know the effectiveness of using such tactics on children.
A ruling finding such tactics deceptive or unfair would similarly bar the
plaintiff from using such tactics in the future.
B. Self-Regulation Is Not Enough
Self-Regulation in the advertising industry is carried out by the
advertising industry's "self-appointed watchdog," the Children's
Advertising Review Unit (CARU).2 6 It has been suggested that this
self-regulation has been relatively ineffective and surveys of marketers
in the industry indicate that many of the respondents had concerns about
the advertising industry's treatment of children. 265 Among the results,
61% agreed that advertising begins at too young an age and 58% felt
266
that there is too much advertising and marketing targeting children.
The effectiveness of any organization's self-regulation is always a
260. See Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 687 (2d Cir. 1971);
Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1166; (3d Cir. 1993); Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d
468 (9th Cir. 1995).
261. See Colligan, 442 F.2d at 692.
262. See BeVier, supra note 63, at 16-17.
263. See supra Part III.C.
264. Linn & Golin, supra note 220, at 31.

265. Id.
266. Id.
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concern. Compliance with CARU's guidelines is voluntary. 267 For
example, while the guidelines state that "[a]ll information that requires
disclosure for legal or other reasons should be in language
understandable by the child audience," most toy ads fail to use simple
language in their disclosures and disclaimers. 26 -Here, with evidence of
ineffective guidelines, concerns expressed by the advertising industry's
insiders themselves, and concern from public policymakers, it is clear
that more effective regulation is needed surrounding the practice of
advertising to children. 2 Many leading food and beverage companies
in the European Union have signed voluntary agreements to advertise
only toward children under twelve where products met specific nutrition
criteria. 2 7 Similarly, in the United States, Burger King and
McDonald's, along with over a dozen packaged food companies, have
recently signed a pledge with the Council of Better Business Bureaus to
advertise only their healthier products like apple sticks and milk to
children under age twelve. 27 1 While such actions are certainly a step in
the right direction, and should be commended, such self-regulation is
merely voluntarily. Until every company follows the same regulations,
there will undoubtedly be problems, not only with compliance, but also
with the strictness of the nutrition standards. Furthermore, until such
advertising no longer uses the problematic tactics discussed, advertising
will still be deceptive, and the brand preferences based on that
deception will still be created. Milk and an apple sticks alone do not
complete a "Happy Meal."
C. FCCand FTC Regulation
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is charged with
"regulating interstate and international communications by radio,
television, wire, satellite and cable." 272 Accordingly, it has attempted to
safeguard the interests of children by regulating some aspects of
advertising, such as requiring "ad break" transitions, prohibiting "host
selling," 273 prohibiting product integration into program content, and
limiting the time allotted.
267. KUNKEL ETAL., supranote 24, at 19.

268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Reuters, Food Makers in Europe Volunteer to Cut Ads Directed at Children, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Nov. 11, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/12/1 l/technology/
adban.php (Coca-Cola, Groupe Danone, Burger King, General Mills, Kellogg, Kraft Foods,
Mars, Nestle, PepsiCo, Ferrero, and Unilever).
271. Rabin, supra note 238.
272. Fed. Comm. Comm'n, About the FCC,(Nov. 15, 2008), http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.
html.
273. "Ad breaks" are transitions such as, "After these messages, we'll be right back"
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The purpose of the FTC is to prevent anticompetitive practices,
"unfair and deceptive acts or practices," and administer a wide variety
of consumer protection laws. 5 The FTC is the agency charged with
276
regulating advertising regardless of the ad's medium of distribution.
As stated, unfair acts or practices are those that cause or are likely to
cause a substantial consumer injury that is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers, and is not offset by countervailing benefits to consumers or
competition. 277 Deceptive acts or practices occur where "there is a
representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's
detriment." 278 The FTC continues to have the power to regulate
deceptive advertising practices to date. However, since Congress
amended the FTC Act in 1980, the FTC no longer has the power to
regulate unfair ads targeting children.279
Congress's amendment to the Act was influenced and fueled by
well-connected lobbyists in the advertising and other related
industries. 28 Yet, the FTC is still able to regulate unfair acts or
practices targeting adults.
The fact that children receive less protection than adults makes little
sense. This Congressional action was a backlash response to the FTC's
whereas "host selling" is when the main characters on a television program sell products during
that program or program blocks adjacent to it. Calvert, supra note 17, at 223.
274. Id.
275. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). Fed. Trade Comm'n, About the Federal Trade Commission,
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last visited Aug. 31, 2009).
276. Calvert, supranote 17, at 223.
277. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006) ("The Commission shall have no authority under this section
or section 57a of this title to declare unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that such act or
practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. In determining whether an act or
practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established public policies as evidence to be
considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a
primary basis for such determination.") Unfairness Policy Statement, appended to In re Int'l
Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. (1984); see also JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 2-3; supra notes 8-12
(providing the FTC's definition of unfairness).
278. Deception Policy Statement, appended to In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110,
177 (1984); see also Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. F.T.C., 785 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1986);
JENNINGS, supranote 3; see supranotes 13-20 (providing the FTC's definition of deception).
279. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (2006) ("The Commission shall not have any authority to
promulgate any rule in the children's advertising proceeding pending on May 28, 1980, or in
any substantially similar proceeding on the basis of a determination by the Commission that
such advertising constitutes an unfair act or practice in or affecting commerce."). Federal Trade
Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 1l(a)(1), (3), 94 Stat. 374, 37879 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h), 57a(b)(1) (2006)); see also JENNINGS,
supra note 3, at 8.
280. JENNINGS, Supra note 3, at 6-8; Starek, supra note 2, paras. 14-16.
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1978 trade rule proposal to ban television advertising to children under
age eight. 281 The FTC's proposal was based on research at the time that
addressed many of the concerns that this Article touches on, namely,
that young children do not understand the persuasive intent and view
advertising as truthful,282 the deceptive nature of advertising to children,
and the unfairness of the advertising given the associated nutritional and
health risks.283 However, due to unfortunate but significant lobbying by
well-connected industries, most notably the advertising industry, and an
overall perception that the FTC rulemaking was too broad, Congress
took action to severely restrict the FTC's powers, 284 and literally halted
all of the FTC's funding, shutting down the agency for a brief time
period and leaving its numerous enforcement functions in tatters. 285 The
agency regained its normal funding only after Congress passed 15
U.S.C § 57a(h) to rescind the FTC's power to regulate unfair
advertising to children.286 Although the agency regained its fundin, it
has yet to regain its ability to regulate unfair advertising to children.7
As a result of the FTC's proposed advertising regulation and the
consequent lobbyist-fueled congressional backlash, which "was toxic to
the Commission as an institution," the FTC has been unable to pursue
regulation of unfair advertising toward children and undoubtedly has
to
been reluctant to aggressively regulate deceptive advertising 289
children 288 in light of the severe repercussions in the agency's history.
That is, the FTC is currently hindered from carrying out the duties
necessary to protect children from problematic advertising, which
consumers undoubtedly believe and expect, albeit mistakenly, to be
inherent to the Commission's primary purpose. Despite the FTC's final
order abandoning the proposed plans to broadly regulate advertising to
children, the FTC held strong to its position that advertising to children

281. JOHN, supranote 35, at 3-4. The FTC's proposal was defeated in 1980. Id.
282. Id.; see also JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 6-7.
283. JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 6-8; JOHN, supranote 35, at 3; see supra Part III.A.
284. JENNINGS, SUpra note 3, at 6-8; Starek, supra note 2, paras. 14-16.
285. Id.; KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 18.
286. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (2006); KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 18.
287. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (2006); JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 6-8; Starek, supra note 2, paras.
15-17. There have been a few limited exceptions where Congress has directed the FTC to issue
regulations regarding certain categories of unfair advertising to children under specific statutory
authorization where Congress has determined that the practices are unfair, such as with pay-percall ads directed toward children. See Starek, supra note 2, paras. 15-17; 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)
(2006). However, under 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h), the FTC still does not have the authority to issue
rules on the basis of unfairness to children without these specific grants of authority from
Congress. See Starek, supranote 2, paras. 15-17; 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (2006).
288. See JENNINGS, supranote 3, at 7-8.
289. Id.
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is a legitimate cause of public concern due to children's
lack of
290
cognitive abilities to effectively evaluate the advertising.
Similar concerns are the reason that the FTC is not the only agency
to have considered proposals to ban all advertising targeting children
audiences the FCC has considered such a policy as well.2 1 A number of
countries, including Belgium, Norway, Sweden, 292 Australia, 293 and the
province of Quebec in Canada have been successful in implementing
such bans.294 Such regulation certainly would not harm our nation's
children. First Amendment rights, however, would likely preclude a
complete ban on advertising targeting children because it may be more
extensive than necessary to accomplish its goals. 295 But the need and
desire to protect children from problematic advertising messages should
not be abandoned simply because of the existence of thirty year old
legislation, which was spurred by the lobbying of the advertising
industry and other interested parties. During those thirty years, we have
learned much about the susceptibility of children to advertising and the
troubling evidence is now much more complete. 296 As of now, adults
and children remain on an unequal footing as a result of their very
different cognitive abilities, thereby leaving children in a vulnerable
position. That lawmakers should favor the interests of the advertising
industry over those of children is disturbing.
D. ParentalEfforts Are Not Sufficient to CounterbalanceTwelve
Billion in Spending
While parents clearly play a role in shaping a child's values and
beliefs, which ultimately help to shape their norms of conduct, the role
297
played by parents varies widely from one household to another.
Parents differ in the degree to which they intervene, their styles of
290. KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 18.
291. Id. In the early 1970s, the FCC considered a proposal to ban all advertising targeting
children, but just decided to restrict the time allotted.
292. EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, REGULATION ON ADVERTISING AIMED AT

CHILDREN: IN EU MEMBER STATES AND SOME NEIGHBOURING STATES 6, 28, 48, 53 (May 25,
2000), http://www.obs.coe.int/onlinepublication/reports/childadv.pdf.en. Belgium, Sweden,
and Norway prohibit all ads (regardless of the targeted audience) before, during, and after
children's programs. Id. Sweden and Norway additionally ban all advertising targeting children
under twelve and thirteen, respectively. Id.; see also KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 18.
293. KUNKELETAL., supra note 24, at 18.

294. Bill Jeffery, The Supreme Court of Canada's Appraisal of the 1980 Ban on
Advertising to Children in Quebec: Implications for "Misleading" Advertising Elsewhere, 39
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 237, 239-40 (2006). Quebec has banned advertising targeting children under
thirteen since 1980, due to the unique vulnerability of children to deception. Id.
295. See infra Part VI.
296. KUNKEL ET AL., supranote 24, at 5-9.
297. See GUNTER ETAL., supra note 41, at 109.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLA W& POLICY

[Vol. 14

communication, their styles of consumer socialization, and their overall
attitudes toward advertising. 298 Ultimately, this variance leads to
children with a wide range of attitudes toward advertising, behavior
patterns, and decision-making processes.299
Parents today are busier than ever. Parental time constraints and
longer working hours limit time spent with children. 30 0 The time and
energy that parents spend with their children should not be
predominated by efforts to combat, reverse, and cure those deceptions
imposed upon children by preventable wrongdoing. Parents have
enough concerns in assuring that they raise healthy, educated, and
respectful young adults. With the current regulation that is in place,
parents would need to turn off the television (or other medium of
advertising) every time commercials come on, or continuously remind
children to be wary of deception and that not all statements can be
regarded as truthful. Such an expectation is unrealistic and would be
unduly burdensome, especially when such wrongful ads can and should
be dealt with at their conception. With advertisers spending upwards of
$12 billion per year toward children, parents are certainly at a
disadvantage from the start. 30 ' The overwhelming
presence of
30 2
marketing alone is stressful enough for families.
While parents are ultimately "the purchaser" in many instances, it
has been shown that parents' spending is strongly influenced by their
children's desires, and many parents give in to such requests. 3 03 While
parents certainly must, and do, set limits on children's desires, parents
34
also have an interest in pleasing their children and avoiding conflicts. 0
Advertisers do not make this easy for parents. Marketers frequently
depict adults as "incompetent, mean, or absent, while encouraging
children to engaged in behaviors that are troublesome to parents."30 For
instance, advertisers often encourage children to play with their food,
using parents' disapproval as a key selling point to the children. This
tactic increases brand appeal by making the child feel in control.30 6
The burden is increased further when children's peer groups add
pressure to parents to purchase products so that their children do not

298. Id. at 108.
299. Id. at 109.
300. SCHOR, supra note 40, at 25.
301. Linn & Golin, supra note 220, at 14.

302. Id. at 30.
303. See GUNTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 111. Focus groups are regularly run on children
as young as five years, due to the widespread effects of children's pestering on their parents'
spending. Id.
304. See GUNTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 111-14.
305. Limn & Golin, supranote 220, at 30.
306. Id. at 30-31.
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feel disadvantaged in comparison to their friends. 30 7 Parents in "timestarved" households are also more willing to spend more money on their
children, and marketers capitalize on this. 30 In particular, there has
been a decline in parental control over the influence of marketing in
recent years, particularly in the food industry. 30 9 In one study, "100
percent of the parents of children aged two to five agreed that their
310
children have a major influence on their food and snack purchases."
Marketers have realized they no longer need to target both parents and
children. 31 1 Simply targeting children directly is enough, "because the
nag factor is so strong on something
like [Fruit Rolls Ups], that you can
3 12
just take advantage of that."
VI. PROPOSED GOVERNMENTAL ACTION & CONSTITUTIONALITY

A. Inadequateand UnnecessaryAction
One potential solution could make use of techniques similar to those
found in the Brucks et al. study and provide children with cues in real
advertising situations that remind children to think critically while
watching commercials. Brucks et al.'s study3 13 made use of two
independent variables: (1) an instructional video providing certain
children subjects with advertising knowledge and (2) an advertising
beliefs quiz administered a few minutes prior to the subjects' exposure
31 4
to the ads to serve as a cue to available advertising knowledge.
Broadcasters could potentially be required to show public service
announcements (PSAs) to serve as cues preceding clusters of
commercials to remind children to be critical of ads (in addition to the
current announcements indicating a break between the children's
program and ads).3 15 Simple direct prompts to cue advertising
307. See GUNTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 111.
308. SCHOR, supra note 40, at 25.
309. Id. at 24.

310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 24-25 (quoting a former employee of Saatchi and Saatchi's Kid Connection, the
marketing firm who represented the widely successful Fruit Roll Up snack food); see also
KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT 217 (2003)
("Advertising directed at younger children creates a demand to which their parents may
respond.").
313. See supra Part II.D.
314. Brucks et al., supra note 78, at 474. The presence of the two independent variables

was manipulated to create four different sets of conditions for four different groups: (1) high
knowledge, cue present, (2) high knowledge, cue absent, (3) low knowledge, cue present, (4)
low knowledge, cue absent. Id.
315. Id.at481.
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knowledge "appear[] [to be] capable of activating advertising
knowledge stored in memory. ' ' 3 r6 However, children would still need to
be provided with the extensive knowledge that would have to be
mentally encoded before they could be cued to retrieve such
information. 317 This could potentially be done with longer, more
extensive PSAs shown periodically during children's programming, or
through educational programs at school. This solution, however, is not
the best option. In order to reach all children viewing problematic ads
and instruct them with the proper information about the content of ads,
PSAs would require repetitious display in various advertising mediums
where children represent a significant portion of the audience, given that
many audiences are a mix of children, teens, and adults.3 18 Reminders
(cues) for children to access this instructive information would also be
required in close proximity to all ads. In other words, rather than simply
weeding out problematic advertising tactics before they air, the various
PSAs would be tasked with combating the problematic advertising and
overpowering their messages in order to be effective. Educational
lessons at school about advertising would be a waste of children's and
teacher's time, as well as a waste of resources and money. Supplanting
valuable education time with lessons designed to counterbalance the
negative effects of advertisers' commercial greed is completely
irrational and an argument that needs no further attention. More
importantly, its effectiveness is a larger concern. While the Brucks et al.
study indicates that cues along with prior instruction can potentially
help children aged eight to twelve (the "cued processors") effectively
use their cognitive defenses against commercials, information
processing research suggests that such cues would be ineffective for
children under the age of eight.319 These younger children
320 are "limited
processors" to which cues are still relatively ineffective.
Another potential solution would be to amend the Lanham Act to
provide consumer standing under section 43(a)(1)(B) 321 on the basis that
consumers are, as a whole, undoubtedly harmed as much, if not more,
than competing advertisers. In addition, the Lanham Act could be
amended to explicitly indicate that different reasonable consumer
standards will apply to children and adults, and potentially even to
subgroups of children (e.g., under eight, eight to twelve, and over
316. Id.
317. Id.at480-81.

318. See Jennings, supranote 3, at 10.
319. Brucks et al., supra note 78, at 480-81; See supra text accompanying notes 34-38
(discussing limited and cued processors).
320. Id.at481.

321. The possibility of providing standing in other sections is beyond the scope and focus
of this Article and therefore is not discussed here.
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twelve). Such an amendment could even specify and prohibit certain
advertising tactics, such as the use of cartoon characters, fantasy worlds,
celebrity endorsements, special effects, extraneous props, puffery, and
others tactics as deemed necessary in ads targeting children. While such
amendments may help protect children to some extent, it would not be
enough to effectively regulate advertising for the reasons discussed in
Part V.D and would unduly burden consumers. Thus, these discussed
amendments are not the best solution, given that action by an external
regulatory body could sufficiently deal with the problems at hand.
B. CongressionalAction, FTC Regulation and Enforcement
The FTC should be given the authority to regulate certain advertising
deemed unfair to children. A bill known as the Healthy Lifestyles and
Prevention America Act of 2007, which was previously introduced in
the House and Senate, 322 would do just that. The Bill proposed to
restore the authority of the FTC to issue regulations restricting unfair
ads toward children, such as those detrimental to the health of children,
by striking 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h).3 23 This Article calls on Congress to
reintroduce and pass the Bill, or one similar to it, to allow the FTC to
regulate unfair ads and provide the FTC with greater freedom and
assurance of their authority to regulate both deceptive and unfair
advertising for adults and children alike.
There is no reason why a regulatory agency such as the FTC should
not have the authority to regulate certain advertising tactics that,
although not necessarily deceptive, are unfair because they are harmful
to children, especially when they have the authority to regulate unfair
advertising targeting adults. Furthermore, restoring this power to the
FTC would allow the agency to regain enough control to properly
regulate deceptive and unfair advertising alike without fear of
Congressional retaliation.

322. Overview of H.R. 2633, supra note 6; Overview of S. 1342, supra note 6.
323. The Healthy Lifestyles and Prevention America Act of 2007 states, in part:
SEC. 402. RULEMAKING AUTHORITY FOR ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN.
(a) Purpose - The purpose of this section is to restore the authority of the
Federal Trade Commission to issue regulations that restrict the marketing or
advertising of foods and beverages to children under the age of 18 years if the
Federal Trade Commission determines that there is evidence that consumption
of certain foods and beverages is detrimental to the health of children.
(b) Authority - Section 18 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C.
57a) is amended by striking subsection (h).
H.R. Rep. No. 110-2633, supranote 6; S. No. 110-1342 at 116, supra note 6.
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Following a restoration of the FTC's authority through such a Bill,
the FTC should then pass regulations regarding the deceptive and unfair
tactics discussed in Part III and prohibit or impose certain restrictions on
those tactics determined to be problematic, eliminating the deception
and unfairness in ads toward children. 324 Many of the above discussed
tactics and issues are arguably deceptive under the FTC's reasonable
child standard, given the supporting research. In addition, many tactics
are also undoubtedly unfair, given the direct link between children's
advertising and obesity, and the other associated physical harms. 325 In
particular, it seems the evidence is currently the strongest for supporting
the regulation of the use of cartoons, fantasy worlds, and celebrity
endorsements. Further research and evaluation may also offer support
for the regulation of the other tactics based on unfairness and material
deceptiveness as well, including exaggerations or opinionated claims,
ineffective disclosures, special effects, extraneous footage, camera and
editing tricks, and overall themes of an ad.
Such regulations could be implemented by requiring the advertising
industry to self-regulate ads, by assigning each ad a rating, such as
"ALL" or "12+." 376 For example, ads appropriate for children under
twelve could receive an "ALL" rating and those not appropriate for
children could receive a "12+" rating. Advertisers could then create
alternate versions of ads appropriate for children and adults. While the
advertising industry would be responsible for implementation of the
regulations, the FTC would be responsible for enforcing the regulations.
To implement the regulations, two different factors would need to be
considered: the target audience of the ad and the target audience of the
program. Where an ad primarily targets a child consumer (whether or
not adults are also targeted by the ad), shown before 9 p.m., the ad
would need to receive an "ALL" rating to be shown. For example, ads
for sugary cereal and toys shown before 9 p.m. (assuming children are
the primary target or affected audience) would need to receive "ALL"
ratings, while ads for shaving cream or diamond rings would not need to
receive the "ALL" rating, because children under twelve do not buy or
significantly sway adults' decisions on such purchases. Children do not
use those products and are obviously not the primary or affected targets.
Any ad (regardless of the product advertised or the targeted
consumer) shown where the program's primary audience is children,
would similarly need to receive an "ALL" rating (e.g., early morning
cartoons, after school television programs), because children would
324. The regulations should not necessarily be limited to those problems addressed in Part
III. There certainly are additional tactics that are potentially deceptive or unfair.
325. The psychological harms of insecurity and materialism are also potential bases for
regulation, as mentioned in Part IV, but not discussed here.
326. Additional ratings could be established if necessary and implementation is plausible.
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undoubtedly be the primary group affected. Where the targeted or
affected audience is equally split between children and adults, or more
heavily affects or targets adults, 12+ ads would be permissible. If the
ads contained tactics found deceptive to children, but truthful to adults
32
such ads would be more likely to inform the public than deceive it. 1
Such ads would likely be permissible.
However, such tactics may still be regulated as unfair if such
regulation is found not to unduly impinge on advertisers' ability to
propose a commercial transaction. 328 Ads aired after 9 p.m. (i.e., the
programs' target audiences are clearly adults) could all be rated "12+."
In addition, for some programs during the day where the target audience
is primarily adults, ads with 12+ ratings could be shown, but could
potentially be blocked by parents if desired. These regulations could be
implemented through the use of V-chip technology, 329 which could
allow parents to restrict "12+" rated commercials from being shown
during all programs their children watch. 330 Furthermore, it could be
used by individuals without children to allow "12+" rated commercials
to be shown at anytime.
C. Constitutionalityof Regulation
Ads propose commercial transactions and are therefore considered
"commercial speech," which receives lesser protection under the First
Amendment than other constitutionally protected expression. 33 1 Courts
apply the four-part Central Hudson analysis for cases involving
commercial speech to determine whether the expression receives

327. See discussion on constitutionality supra Part V.C.
328. See infra Part VI.C.
329. The FCC currently requires all television sets thirteen inches or larger manufactured
after January 1, 2000 to have V-Chip technology, which enables the television to "read"
information encoded in the rated program, and allows parents to block programs they feel are
inappropriate. Fed. Comm. Comm'n, FCC V-Chip, http://www.fcc.gov/vchip/ (last visited Aug.
31, 2009).
330. Significant numbers of children watch programs that primarily target older
demographics. Linn & Golin, supra note 220, at 16 (noting that American Idol, a primetime
show, is top-rated show for children). Regulation that simply establishes ratings for ads and then
leaves parents to effectuate any and all bans would not be sufficient for reasons similar to those
discussed in Part IV. Most parents are not aware of the direct links between advertising and the
discussed harms. Regularly reminding parents and informing new parents would be burdensome
on the government. Moreover, many parents aware of these risks simply may not take the time
to implement the limitations or know how. Rather, the most efficient and effective manner
would be to have the FTC impose the initial restrictions while giving parents the option of
removing those restrictions if they deem removal necessary.
331. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980).
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protection. 332 Under the first prong, courts333 determine whether it
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.
Misleading speech or speech that promotes unlawful activity does
not receive protection and therefore can be banned.3 34 Because the First
Amendment basis for the protection of commercial speech is based on
the informative function of advertising, there "can be no constitutional
objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not
accurately inform the public.. ." and "[t]he government may ban forms
of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform
it."'335 The specific advertising tactics discussed herein do not accurately
inform children of the products and given their cognitive abilities, are
more likely to deceive them than inform them about the products.
However, such tactics must also be material, or likely to affect a
consumer's conduct or decision. Given their pervasive use by
advertisers and their demonstrated ability to affect children's decisions,
cartoons, fantasy worlds, and celebrity endorsements should be found
materially deceptive where the ads utilizing such tactics specifically
target children.
The use of the other tactics discussed such as
exaggerations (i.e., statements classifiable as puffery to adults),
ineffective disclosures, special effects, extraneous footage, camera and
editing tricks, and overall themes of an ad may be materially deceptive
in certain instances.
Research should further explore the effect of such tactics on children
to determine whether such tactics materially influence children's
decisions. The use of such tactics may not be deceptive or materially
deceptive in all instances. For instance, a minor exaggeration about one
aspect of a product may not influence a decision, whereas a major
exaggeration or one that highlights a different product feature may have
an impact. Regulation and enforcement should take a closer look at
advertisers' use of such tactics from the true perspective of children.
In the event that a particular tactic is not found deceptive toward
children, in contrast to this Article's position regarding certain tactics
discussed herein, or where the ad targets or affects an equal or greater
number of adults as it does children (i.e., the tactic would not be more
likely to deceive the targeted audience than inform it), the expression
would not be considered misleading, but truthful. Since truthful speech
is protectable, we must analyze it under the second prong of the
commercial speech analysis.

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id. at 566.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 563.
See supra Part III.D-E.
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The second prong examines whether the government would have a
substantial interest in enacting the regulation to limit the truthful
speech.337 The government's primary substantial interest here would be
preventing childhood obesity, which has been directly linked to ads and
those additional harms with which obesity is associated.338
Given that there is a substantial interest, the third prong inquires
whether the regulation directly advances the government's stated
interest.339 "This burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or
conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction
on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are
real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree., 340 Consequently, "[the] regulation cannot be sustained if it
provides 34
only
ineffective or remote support for the government's
1
purpose."
The discussed tactics that can be shown to be highly influential in
persuading children to purchase those products associated with the
health harms could be restricted. For instance, fantasy worlds and
cartoon characters have been demonstrated to have powerful influence
over children and such tactics are used by an overwhelming number of
advertisers targeting children. 342 Reducing the unwarranted
persuasiveness of these ads and their influence over children by
restricting certain tactics found to unduly influence children would
directly advance the government's interest given the direct link between
advertising and obesity.
Moreover, additional evidence indicates that such regulations would
be effective. In Quebec, a ban of advertising targeting children has been
paralleled by obesity rates and soft drink consumption levels that are
among the lowest in Canada, while the consumption of fruits and
vegetables are among the highest in Canada.3 43 Furthermore, it has been
shown that "[b]anning fast food advertisements from children's
television programs would reduce the number of overweight children in
the U.S. by 18 percent and decrease the number of overweight teens by
337. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
338. As mentioned, other harms such as the psychological harms of materiality and
insecurity, have also been linked to advertising, but are not discussed here. See supra Part IV.
Such harms could be considered substantial interests provided there is sufficient evidence of the
harms' causation to pass the CentralHudson analysis.
339. Id.
340. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (quoting Greater New
Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) (quoting Edenfield v.
Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (U.S. 1993))).
341. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 566 (quoting CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 564); GreaterNew
OrleansBroad.Ass'n, 527 U.S. at 188.
342. See supra Part III.D.
343. Jeffery, supra note 294, at 239-40.
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14 percent . . . ."344 Thus, such regulation would clearly advance this
interest. While this Article does not propose a complete ban, restricting
the use of such widely used tactics known to significantly impact
children's decisions would surely alleviate the harms in a manner
similar to those complete bans, but just to a lesser degree. While the
research regarding the impact of the other tactics discussed herein does
not appear to be as widespread as those for cartoon characters, the
restriction of such tactics could similarly occur where it would
materially alleviate the harms. Evidence of such alleviation is necessary
to determine what forms of regulation would support the purpose of
reducing physical health harms while meeting the narrowness
requirements of the fourth prong.
Under the fourth prong, a court determines whether the regulation 345
is
more extensive than necessary to advance the government's interest.
If the regulation is overly extensive, the regulation will not be
permitted, while regulation proportional to meeting the substantial
interest will be permitted to restrict the speech.346 The regulation must
be narrowly tailored to the asserted interest, but the fit does not have to
be perfect. 47 The fit need only be reasonable in that the regulation
"represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose
scope is in proportion to the interest served., 348 The proposed regulation
here would not be more extensive than necessary because it would not
completely ban the tactics, but rather, would ban them only where
children are primarily targeted. This is likely where the advertised
products and adjacent programs or activities (i.e., internet advergaming)
target children. Ads in compliance with such regulations could still
target children and would still reach adults at all times in their restricted
form. Where children are not likely to be the primary age group targeted
or affected by a certain product or at a given time slot, the ads could be
permitted without these restrictions.
In the event that restricting the discussed tactics proved to be
ineffective in reducing obesity, a ban on the advertising of unhealthy
food to children (as opposed to simply banning the discussed tactics)
could be enacted. At such a time, it would seem clear that such a
proposal would not be overly extensive, given the persistently strong
effect of the restricted ads.
A 2001 Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of
regulations imposed on tobacco ads provides a useful benchmark
regarding harmful ads targeting children. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Rabin, supra note 238.
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
Id.
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999).
Id. (quoting Bd. of Tr. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
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Reilly349 applied the Central Hudson analysis to regulations that
prohibited outdoor tobacco ads350 within a 1,000-foot radius of a school
or playground. 35 ' The Court found that the regulations satisfied the first
three prongs,352 but ultimately were not tailored narrowly enough.3 53
The court found that in some areas, the regulations would "constitute
nearly a complete ban on the communication of truthful information
about [the products] to adult consumers." 354 As a result, the regulations
were found more extensive than necessary to advance the substantial
interest of preventing underage tobacco use. 355 However, the Court
made it clear that more narrowly drawn rules that "demonstrate a
careful calculation of the speech interests involved" could be held
constitutional.356 The Court also noted legitimate speech interests (such
as truthful communication to adults) can be limited as long as the
limitation does not "unduly impinge on the speaker's ability to propose
a commercial transaction and the adult listener's opportunity to obtain
information about products. 357
The proposed regulations in this Article based on deceptiveness or
unfairness, accompanied by the requisite supporting evidence discussed
here, as well as careful FTC calculations of the interests that advertisers
and adults have in exchanging information regarding unhealthy foods,
would satisfy the four prongs of the Central Hudson test. These
proposed regulations do not simply ban all ads targeting children (like
some countries do), ban all ads for unhealthy products (altogether or
during children's programs), ban all ads during certain time frames, or
impose other more restrictive regulations-regulations which would be
likely to fail the Central Hudson test at this juncture. Rather, these
proposed regulations merely ban the specific tactics used by advertisers
within these ads. Not only is truthful, factual information about the
products still capable of reaching adults at all times, it is also capable of
reaching children at all times. Merely the deceptive, or alternatively, the
overly persuasive tactics that lead to unfair harms are being restricted.
Thus, it seems clear that the proposed restrictions on the discussed
349. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,525 (2001).
350. The Massachusetts regulations at issue had targeted all outdoor and point-of-sale ads
for all tobacco products, but the Court only applied the analysis to cigar and smokeless tobacco
advertising, because it found federal law had preempted the Massachusetts' regulations of
outdoor and point-of-sale cigarette advertising. Lorillard,533 U.S. at 546. Only the analysis of
the outdoor ads are discussed here.
351. Lorillard,533 U.S. at 556.
352. Id. at 561-64.
353. Id. at 564-65.
354. Id. at 562.
355. Id. at 565.
356. Id. at 562; see SAuNDERS, supra note 312, at 221.
357. Lorillard,533 U.S. at 565.
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advertising tactics determined deceptive
or unfair in ads targeting
35
children would be held constitutional.

8

VII. CONCLUSION
"Although marketing and advertising fuel the U.S. economy, the cost
of that economic success requires considerable scrutiny." ' 9 While
advertisers will always have a persuasive intent behind their ads to
present the product in a favorable light, advertising tactics that are either
deceptive or that unfairly capitalize on children's limited cognitive
abilities should not be permitted. As stated, the true cognitive
perspective of children must be considered when determining the
deceptiveness or unfairness within an ad.
In light of the research discussed, and the nature of children's
advertising today, current regulation and enforcement do not appear to
consider a child's true perspective. Tactics such as the use of cartoons,
fantasy worlds, and celebrity endorsements should be regulated as
materially deceptive toward children. At the same time, mere persuasive
advertising per se is not necessarily problematic for children-as long
as it is not deceptive or unfair.
In other words, where advertising is directed primarily toward
children (or is likely to primarily affect children) and is unlikely to
mislead the reasonable child consumer and affect that child's conduct,
the tactic will not be deceptive and should be allowed. 360 The other
tactics discussed, such as exaggerations or opinionated claims,
ineffective disclosures, special effects, extraneous footage, camera and
editing tricks, and overall themes of an ad should be researched further
and evaluated to determine whether certain instances or the use of the
tactics per se are materially deceptive to children. While some uses of
these tactics to some extent will likely be permissible, in some instances
their use may rise to a material level of deceptiveness.
Similarly, as long as certain advertising tactics do not cause
significant harm in children, they will not be deemed unfair. Thus, an ad
for a product that accurately describes and represents the product's true
characteristics and capabilities and poses no significant threat to a
child's physical or mental health or well-being will be permissible. Ads
358. However, as noted previously, in the event that the elimination of such tactics from
unhealthy ads failed to reduce obesity in children, and direct links could still be established to
the ads, it would then be clear that more extensive regulations would be needed. At that point,
the FTC would then be able to impose more restrictive regulations, such as a ban of all
unhealthy food ads during children's programs, regardless of the tactics used.
359. Calvert, supra note 17, at 225.
360. This reasoning is based on the definition of deception provided in supra Part V.C.
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for products that fall below this standard should be examined to
determine whether they fall to the level of being deceptive or unfair. It
has been demonstrated that the use of cartoons, fantasy worlds, and
celebrity endorsements have significant impacts on children's decisions
as consumers. With these ads linked to obesity in children, the use of
such influential tactics should be prohibited where children are targeted.
The effects of the other tactics discussed here should also be researched
and evaluated further, and considered for potential regulation where
they are linked to harm. Obesity and the other health problems
associated with obesity are preventable harms from which children
should be shielded while their young minds are still developing and
incapable of filtering certain information or making fully informed
decisions.
By restricting the advertising tactics used and allowing only truthful,
non-deceptive, non-misleading information to be conveyed to children
under twelve, regulation will progress toward evening the playing field
between advertisers and child consumers, something that we as adult
consumers take for granted. Furthermore, by requiring advertisers to
convey additional, understandable information to children about the
product itself, children will have more knowledge about the actual
advertised product so that they have the ability to make informed
decisions with knowledge of the product's actual attributes at hand. This
can potentially be done through the discussed congressional action
restoring the FTC's regulatory authority and the discussed additional
FTC regulation. However, should the regulation of the discussed tactics
prove ineffective, the FTC should then potentially consider broader
regulation and ban unhealthy ads at times where children are primarily
the targeted or affected audience, provided there still remains a
connection between the limited advertising and the harms discussed. At
the moment however, it seems clear that when it comes to advertising
tactics-tricks are not for kids.

160

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW& POLICY

[Vol. 14

